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Abstract 
This study examines how recall measured over three time periods can be affected by mood 
induction, personality traits, and image characteristics.  There were 101 people who participated 
in Session 1, 92 participants completed Session 2, and 77 participants completed Session 3.  
Subjects were randomly assigned to a group with negative mood induction or to a control group.  
Personality traits were measured using the NEO-FFI.  The participants were asked to view 57 
images and rate them by pleasantness and arousal.  Following the presentation of images 
participants were asked to recall as many images as possible immediately after the presentation, 
one day after presentation, and one week after presentation.  Generalized Linear Models were 
used to analyze the data.  Unpleasant images were recalled with greater frequency during all 
three time periods.  In addition, a quadratic expression was used to demonstrate that pleasant 
images also were recalled with greater frequency than neutral images.  The personality trait of 
Neuroticism was negatively correlated with recall during Session 1 and Session 3.  It is 
postulated that higher levels of Neuroticism provide a protective role when viewing negative 
images through reduced attention.  Alternatively, it is possible that people with a higher level of 
Neuroticism may be desensitized to negative images and therefore less affected by unpleasant 
images.  People who experienced a negative mood induction experienced images more 
pleasantly although this did not affect recall ability.  This study is one of the first to examine how 
mood induction can interact with personality variables the hedonic valence of the images to 
affect recall over three time periods.  The implications for these findings are discussed and 
suggestions are provided for future research. 
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Introduction 
Images have a long history of use for providing information, which over time has 
included cave paintings, hieroglyphics, and the Bayeux Tapestry.  Images often leave 
lasting impression on the viewer; for example, the National Geographic image of the 
“Afghan girl” Sharbat Gula became one of the most popular images the magazine has had 
on its cover.  The popularity of her photograph led to the production of a television 
documentary 17 years later entitled the Search for the Afghan Girl.  The utility of images 
can be seen in the use of billboards and logos.  Images are often used to convey 
information in a meaningful and lasting way.  The intention of this study is to further 
explore why people to remember some photographic images but not others.  To examine 
why some images are better recalled than others one could analyze the physical 
properties of the image, which include the composition of the image, the dimensions of 
the image, and the clarity of the image.  By the same token, variables inherent to the 
observer can be important in understanding which images are remembered.  This thesis 
will focus on identifying individual factors associated with the viewer that influence 
which images are recalled.   
Television shows, movies, and storytellers have long used a congruent tone of 
voice and/or congruent music to enthral audiences.  Music in horror movies will often 
change before frightening moments increasing levels of arousal and attention to enhance 
the event that is about to occur.  Images are also able to produce mood shifts and, in 
contrast to stories and movies, are able to succinctly summarize information.  If mood 
can be demonstrated to affect recall, a presenter could increase the likelihood of the 
audience to recall an image, and consequently the message, by preceding the image with 
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a congruent mood induction.  In this way the audience is primed for attending to 
information in the image and will more likely remember the image.  Similarly, if 
personality traits can be demonstrated to affect mood induction and/or the memory for 
images, understanding of the influence of personality traits could allow people to tailor 
the presentation of images for target audiences.  This could be useful in a variety of 
settings, for example, clinical settings, non-profit organisations, and public health 
advertisements.  The objective of this study is to examine the effects of personality traits 
and moods on the memory for images.   
 Viewing and recalling an image engages various cognitive processes within the 
viewer; for example, perception, encoding, and retrieval.  Visual processes are not 
managed in isolation from other cognitive processes specifically during the earlier stages 
of processing.  For example, people viewing the optical illusion of the old lady and the 
young lady can be influenced if they are told which image to expect.  The cognitive 
process of focus in this study is the emotional state of the viewer, which includes the 
emotional state prior to viewing the image and the viewer’s emotional reaction to the 
image.  The presence of an emotion prior to viewing the image has been demonstrated to 
affect the viewer’s ability to recall the image.  Stones and Bygate (2009) induced a 
slightly anxious mood in half their participants before viewing a set of images.  For those 
individuals who experienced a slightly negative mood induction, Stones and Bygate 
found an increased memory for unpleasant images.  That is, an individual’s memory for 
images was demonstrated to be influenced by the congruency between mood state of the 
viewer and the image composition.  This study and others (Anderson, Wais, & Gabrieli, 
2006; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Eich, & Metcalfe, 1989; Hamann, 
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2001) demonstrate that the emotional state of the viewer and the emotional interpretation 
of the image each affect the recall of the image.   
There are many individual factors that can affect the recollection of an image.  
Our perceptions and interpretations of images has the ability to affect our emotions, 
consequently, the emotional content of the image will also influence how an image is 
recalled.  Studies have demonstrated that the emotional content of the image often affects 
the recall of the image; positive and negative images are recalled with greater frequency 
and over longer periods of time when compared to neutral images (Eich & Macauley, 
1989).  Additional studies have demonstrated that while an emotional experience or 
interpretation of the image can enhance the consolidation of memories, the addition of a 
β-adrenergic receptor antagonist (relaxing smooth muscles) blocks this enhancement 
(Cahill, Prins, Weber, & McGaugh, 1994). 
Emotional states and reactions are shaped by individual characteristics.  A rich 
area of research regarding individual characteristics is in the field of personality as 
measured by the five-factor model, also called the Big Five Personality model (Digman, 
1996).  Personality traits from the five-factor model have been shown to predict a variety 
of experiences such as the predisposition for individuals to experience emotional states; 
specifically, Neuroticism is defined by the propensity to experience emotional states 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992) that are relevant across a variety of emotional experiences.  A 
study by Arana, Meilan, and Perez (2008) demonstrated that personality traits were 
moderately related to the execution of memory task.  They used the 16-PF Questionnaire 
(Cattell, Cattell, & Cattell, 1993) and examined memory functioning using a prospective 
memory task indicating whether they had seen images of people with beards or glasses. 
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Without indication of time, participants had to indicate their responses every five 
minutes.  In a second task participants were shown a list of 32 words, then asked to 
complete a 60-minute questionnaire, followed by a recall task for the word list.  The 
personality traits of “global self-control”, “reasoning”, and “rule-consciousness” were 
related to recall (Arana, Meilan, and Perez, 2008).  Consequently, it is anticipated that 
personality differences will influence the type of pictures remembered for this study.  
Mood differences and personality differences may direct an individual’s attention to 
emotionally or personally congruent information and in so doing increase the memory for 
that information.  The recollection of mood congruent information is not expected to 
affect the capacity for recall.  An individual’s capacity for recall is limited by their 
cognitive capabilities.  Mood congruent information is expected to affect the salience of 
mood congruent information and thereby direct the cognitive resources to that task.  
Studies to date have not described a difference in recall ability; they have only 
demonstrated a difference in the type of information recalled.  As such, mood and 
personality differences are not expected affect the overall number of pictures 
remembered, they are only expected to affect the type of images recalled. 
The aims of this study is to examine how the ability to recall an image could be 
affected by the emotional content of the image, the emotional disposition of the viewer, 
and the personality of the viewer.  Most studies that examined image recall reported 
recall ability that occurs either immediately after image presentation (e.g., Eich, & 
Macaulay, 2000; Rusting, & DeHart, 2000; Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 
2007) or less frequently, one week later (e.g., Anderson, Wais, & Gabrieli, 2006).  This 
study examined recall over three time periods; immediately after presentation, 24 hours 
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later, and one week later.  This allows for the examination of how the variables of mood 
and personality affect recall over time.  The use of three time periods also allows for 
inferences to be made regarding differences in the strength of memory consolidation.   
A commonly used tool used to examine the effect of mood upon memory is the 
image library in the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008).   The IAPS was first published in 1988 and had 460 pictures.  The 
library of images has increased to more than 800 images and each image has normative 
data for the emotions generated by viewing the image.  The authors characterize the 
emotion generated by using two factors: the degree of pleasure or displeasure 
experienced, which they term hedonic valence, and the degree of arousal experienced.  
The degree or type of hedonic valence is described as providing people with an appetitive 
or defensive motivation (Lang et al., 2008); a positive hedonic valence would generate an 
appetitive motivation while a negative hedonic valence would generate a defensive 
motivation.  The level of arousal produced by an image is posited to describe the amount 
of motivational activation generated.  For example, most people interpret an image of 
puppies as very pleasant and moderately arousing.  Most people viewing an image of 
puppies would have an appetitive motivation toward the image (e.g., they would choose 
to look at the image longer) and the intensity of arousal generated by viewing the image 
would contribute to the level of behavioural activation expressed by the viewer to enact 
their appetitive motivation. 
Research and theories examining the influence of emotions on cognitions will be 
presented.  These will demonstrate that emotions are an integral part of the processing 
information and support the investigation of emotions to affect the recall of information.  
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Following the review of moods and cognitions, specific research examining memory and 
mood will demonstrate that the mood of an individual can affect their memory and 
studies describing these findings will be described.  Next, literature that examines mood 
induction will be reviewed.  This research demonstrates that a mood induction can shift 
mood and that those shifts in moods can affect which images or words will be 
remembered.  Then, the literature describing personality traits and moods will be 
examined with particular focus on the big five personality factors of neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness.   
These topics are relevant to the hypothesis that mood and personality differences 
will influence which pictures are remembered.  This study will replicate and expand upon 
the research of Stones and Bygate (2009) and examine how mood induction and 
personality traits interact to affect the memory for images.  Attending to personality traits 
presenters may be able to more appropriately target their messages by tailoring a mood 
induction that is suitable to their audience so as to increase the effectiveness of their 
presentations.  Additionally, this study provides a contribution to the research by 
examining memory over three time periods which to examine how the characteristics of 
the image, of a person’s mood, or of a person’s personality are more meaningful 
indicators of recall for short-term memory and for long-term memory. 
Theories of Emotion 
Theories outlining the nature of emotions have a long history predating Socrates 
(Solomon, 2008).  In his historical review of some of the philosophies of emotion 
Solomon (2008) indicates that the most common metaphor used to describe reason and 
emotion has been of master and slave.  Solomon states that some philosophers like 
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Aristotle have argued that emotions are inferior to reason while other philosophers like 
Hume have argued the opposite asserting that we are a slave to our passion.  Pertinent to 
this study, Solomon asserts that it is now generally accepted that reason and emotions can 
affect each other (Solomon, 2008).  Mood induction studies provide good examples for 
how reason and emotion affect one another.  Following a period of mood induction, these 
studies seek to change an emotional state to explore how emotions affect thinking.  It is 
now commonly understood that emotions have efferent and afferent pathways between 
other cortical functions; by biological definition emotions and cognitions can affect each 
other (e.g., Johnsen, Tranel, Lutgendorf, & Adolphs, 2009; Panksepp, 2005).  Current 
theories of emotions will be examined to provide indications for potential reasons that 
emotions may influence other cognitive processes. 
The experience and interaction between emotion and cognition has been an area 
of contention and there is a well-known story about blind men and an elephant that is 
particularly fitting to describe why this contention exists.  The story begins with a group 
of blind men who are asked to describe an elephant and each one touches a different part 
of the elephant to determine what they are touching.  The blind men only touch one area 
of the elephant and come up with very different descriptions according to the areas they 
touched (e.g., like a trunk, like a wall, like a snake).  This analogy fits for the study of 
emotion because the definitions for emotion have often been shaped by the theoretical 
perspective used to study emotions in the author’s field of study.  An overview of the 
biological, sociological, and psychological definitions of emotion will demonstrate the 
differences between these perspectives.  A biological approach will be presented, which 
identifies emotions based upon the neural correlates.  Then some research by sociological 
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researchers will be examined to see how emotions are common across cultures.  Finally, 
psychological definitions will be presented that will demonstrate the utility and 
consequences of emotions.  Each of the definitions is shaped by the methodologies used 
for examination.  Each of the following authors was reluctant to define a “basic” emotion, 
but they were willing to provide common emotions. 
The biological underpinnings of emotion have been described by Panksepp (e.g., 
Panksepp 1982, 1991, 2003, 2008).  Panksepp (2008) defines emotions as “diffuse global 
states generated by deep subcortical brain structures, interacting with primitive 
viscerosomatic body (core self) representations that remain poorly mapped” (p. 48).  
Panksepp and Watt (2011) distinguish three types of emotional processes; these include 
sensory processes (like foods experienced as tasty or disgusting), body-homeostatic 
processes (like pain, fatigue, hunger, and thirst), and brain emotional processes that most 
closely resemble colloquial examples of emotion.  For the brain emotional processes, 
Panksepp (2005) has identified seven basic emotional types: seeking, fear, rage, lust, 
care, panic, and play.  Although this list of basic emotions lacks sadness as an emotion, 
Panksepp defines sadness as a lack of the emotion of “play”.  Panksepp and Watt (2001) 
reported that many of these definitions were derived from animal studies and he 
acknowledges that some researchers from other fields are reluctant to use animal data to 
define “human” emotions. 
Using a sociological approach, researchers like Ekman (e.g., Ekman 1972, Ekman 
& Cordaro 2011) have compared facial expressions of people from different cultures 
during periods of emotions in an attempt to identify basic emotions.  Ekman’s 
observations led to the discovery of the striking similarities in how disparate cultures 
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physically express emotion.  (Ekman’s research was the basis of the television show Lie 
to Me.)  Ekman and Cordaro (2011) have outlined a list of 7 universal emotion processes: 
anger, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, contempt, happiness.  Ekman and Cordaro further 
assert that they expect to find evidence for many more universal emotional processes. 
Izard (2011) stated that there are no basic emotions but there are emotions that are 
more fundamental. Ekman and Izard both released their thesis of facial expression of 
emotion in 1971 (Ekman 1971, Izard 1971).  The coincidental timing of their theories on 
emotion and facial expressions were brought about by the late Silvan Tomkins (Ekman, 
1993) who had encouraged each to study facial expressions of emotion without telling the 
other.  This came as an unwelcome surprise to both Ekman and Izard (Ekman, 1993).  
The development of his theory of emotions was through the analysis of the facial 
expressions of infants and young children (Izard, 1971; Izard, Fantauzzo, Castle, et al., 
1995; Izard, Hembree, & Huebner, 1987).  Emotions were hypothesized to emanate from 
facial expressions.  The population studied, infants and young children, shaped the theory 
by Izard to examine the evolutionary or biological benefits of emotion that produced a 
different list of fundamental emotions.  Izard lists the fundamental emotions: interest, joy, 
sadness, anger, and fear.  Izard asserts that fundamental emotions do not require complex 
cognitions, fundamental emotions are more specific, fundamental emotions emerge 
earlier in ontogeny than do emotion schemas, and fundamental emotions contribute to 
motivational processes that assist in survival and well-being.  Izard emphasises that the 
experience of fundamental emotions is rare and limited to periods of early development 
and highly threatening situations; conversely, during most situations, emotion schemas 
are part of everyday life.  Emotion schemas, Izard affirms, always involve interactions 
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among emotion feelings and cognitions that include thoughts, strategies, and goals.   
The preceding theorists presented (Panksepp, Ekman, and Izard) were disinclined 
to identifying emotions as “basic” because they see emotions as part of a more 
complicated cognitive process.  In contrast to these authors who have attempted to 
provide fundamental or low-level emotions, Ortony and Turner (1990) and Turner and 
Ortony (1992) claimed that there are no basic single state emotions.  One of their reasons 
for rejecting the notion of basic emotions is for the reason that leading researchers have 
differing opinions on which emotions are basic.  Panskepp, Ekman, and Izard have 
postulated a set of basic emotions that ranges from five to seven or more in number.  
Turner and Ortony (1992) further asserted that the differences in their identification of 
basic emotions are different due to the method used to study emotion (Panskepp studied 
the biology, Ekman and Izard studied facial expressions using different populations).  
Turner and Ortony asserted that due to these factors it is more reasonable to consider 
emotions to be a combination of a physiological state and a cognition that makes sense 
about that situation. 
An alternative view of emotions is that all emotions can be reduced to two 
dimensions – affective valence, ranging from positive to negative, and arousal level, 
ranging from excited to calm.   Psychologists have attempted to identify emotions using a 
utilitarian point of view.  In the past, some authors have suggested that emotions are the 
product of cognitive processes, which includes the anticipation, experience, and 
imagining of environmental outcomes.  Others had suggested that emotions are automatic 
experiences that are influenced by classical conditioning.  In 1962 Schachter and Singer 
identified physiological states of arousal and cognitive appraisal as each being important 
11 
 
in the experience of emotions.  Their study examined the role of cognitions in the 
experience of emotion.  All participants in their experiment were informed that they were 
receiving a vitamin; participants were divided into a group that was injected with 
adrenaline and a group that was injected with a saline solution.  Further, half of the 
participants in each group were told that the injection would cause physiological side 
effects such as trembling and a pounding heart.  The other half of the adrenaline group 
was informed that they might experience irrelevant side effects or none at all.  Schachter 
and Singer discovered several important interactions that have held up over time.  The 
first was that the people who were informed that there would be some physiological 
effects of the injection, regardless of the group, experienced less emotion, both positive 
and negative, across situations.  Secondly, people who had no explanation for the 
adrenalin induced physical arousal labeled their arousal in terms of the available 
cognitive explanations.   
The two factor theory of emotion that resulted from the Schachter and Singer 
(1962) study establishes that emotions are a product of a person’s physiological state of 
arousal combined with their cognition that makes best sense of the situation.  A parallel 
cognitive explanation for the findings Schachter and Singer (1962) theory can be found 
by examining Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance.  Festinger stated that 
cognitive dissonance, an unpleasant state, was created when there is an individual 
experience of incongruent thoughts, knowledge, actions, beliefs, and/or feelings.  Further, 
an individual will be motivated to reduce cognitive dissonance by resolving the by 
explaining away the differences or by changing one of the incongruent conditions.  
Participants in the study by Schacter and Singer (1962) did not have an explanatory 
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mechanism and their mood state had to change to reflect their current level of 
physiological arousal.  In response, their emotional state changed to reflect the physical 
arousal that they were experiencing.  Another way of understanding the process outlined 
by Schacter and Singer could be to use the theory of cognitive therapy (CT) developed by 
Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery’s (1979).  They posit that the initial interpretation of 
environmental events is often an automatic process that is congruent with existing 
emotions.  Further, CT proposes that thoughts generated while experiencing a depressive 
mood or episode are inevitably congruent with the existing emotional, these distorted 
thoughts contribute to the maintenance of depression. 
Rather than viewing emotions as discrete physiological states, independent of 
other emotions, some researchers have examined dimensional models for describing 
affect.  The circumplex model of affect was described by Russell (1980).  Through the 
use of factor analysis and multidimensional scaling, he posited that affect had two 
dimensions, valence and arousal, and that all emotions could be located on those two 
dimensions (Figure 1).  Valence described the pleasantness of the experience and it 
ranged from unpleasant to pleasant.  Arousal described the level of activation during the 
affective state and it ranged from deactivation to activation.   
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Figure 1: Russell’s 1980 formulation of the circumplex model for 28 affect words. 
 
This model has been refined over time and Figure 2 provides an elaboration of the 
circumplex model (Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005).  An additional benefit to using the 
circumplex model is that the dimensions of valence and arousal can be described by 
neurological correlates.  The valence process is associated with the processes of reward 
and pleasure and is hypothesized to be related to the cortical structures typically 
associated with mesolimbic centre – the ventral tegmental area to the nucleus accumbens 
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and has abundant connections to the prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus 
(Posner, Russell, & Peterson).  Arousal, in contrast, is associated with more basic 
correlates neurological functioning, the reticular formation, the thalamus, the amygdala, 
and the parietal cortex.  As depicted in Figure 2, the emotions of depressed and stressed 
are relatively close together in this two dimension space.  The circumplex model of affect 
provides some explanation for the high comorbidity between mood and anxiety disorders 
because of their proximity in affective space. 
 
 
Figure 2: Posner, Russell, and Peterson (2005) depiction of the circumplex model of  
 
affect. 
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Posner, Russell, & Peterson (2005) further presume that the proximity in affective 
space between mood and anxiety disorders provides some explanation for why 
antidepressant medication is often effective for both.  Although the circumplex model 
describes emotions as a combination of valence, arousal, and cognitions, Schacter and 
Singer describe emotions as the product of arousal and cognitions.  While these may 
seem like different descriptors of emotion, Schacter and Singer are describing the 
development of an emotion when there is no emotion present.  Emotional states are 
pervasive in life and occasions without the experience of emotion are uncommon.  In this 
manner, the degree of affective valence experienced by a person becomes as important as 
the arousal level of the person in determining how they will interpret an event.  That is, a 
person experiencing an unpleasant valence will experience an event much differently than 
someone experiencing a pleasant valence, which would be epitomized in the work by 
Beck, Emery, and Shaw with their theory of CT.  Perhaps most revealing of how these 
measures are similar is rotate the Posner, Russell, and Peterson figure counter clockwise 
by 45° (Figure 3).  This rotation produces well-known positive and negative affect 
components as measured by scales like PANAS (Watson, Clark, &Tellegen, 1988).  Such 
measures are respectively predicted by neuroticism (valence) and extroversion (arousal) 
suggesting that temperament underlies these affective components (Watson & Clark, 
1994).  While Schacter and Singer described emotion as a product of cognitions and 
arousal, the circumplex model examines emotions as a product of cognitions and 
experiences upon the two dimensional affective state.  Further, the circumplex model can 
applied to personality traits like neuroticism and extroversion.   
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Figure 3.  The circumplex model rotated counter clockwise by 45° demonstrating 
a y-axis of elated and depressed and an x-axis of relaxed to stressed. 
  
Summary 
This section has provided an examination of emotions and how they are defined 
in different ways by different researchers.  Rather than being superfluous, each of these 
prominent theorists has supported and affirmed the interaction between emotions and 
cognitions.  The interplay between cognitions and emotions has been witnessed and 
described for some time in various manners depending on the field of study.  There are 
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two distinct models used to understand the emotional experience, categorical models and 
dimensional models.  Models were presented by Panksepp, Ekman, and Izard examined 
the biological underpinnings of emotion to categorize and catalogue emotions by 
attaching them to specific biological processes or facial expressions.  Ortony and Turner 
described some problems with the concept of basic emotions, and indeed, all categorical 
authors (Ekman  & Cordaro, 2011; Izard, 2011; Panksepp & Watt, 2011) did not believe 
that the idea of basic emotions was accurate.  An alternative to basic emotions is the 
circumplex model of emotions, a dimensional model that seeks to describe the experience 
of emotion along two dimensions.  This model has been demonstrated to be flexible in 
the conceptualization of affect, while including a hierarchical component of cognitive 
processes to further refine the emotional expression.  Further, as previously described, the 
IAPS utilizes this conceptualization of emotions and the IAPS images have been used 
extensively to study mood and behaviour.  Therefore, the two-dimensional model is 
sufficient and appropriate tool for the investigation of emotions.  The following section 
examines this combination by more specially focusing on how moods affect memory, 
beginning with a description of the factors of memory central to this study.   
Memory and Moods 
Memory is a broad field of research and researchers in different areas of science 
described memory in a manner suitable to the area of research.  Baddeley (2000), who 
developed the concept of working memory in 1974, demonstrated that working memory 
in the field of cognitive psychology generally refers to a limited capacity system allowing 
the temporary storage and manipulation of information necessary for such complex tasks 
as comprehension, learning, and reasoning.  In contrast, working memory in the animal 
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learning laboratory where the term refers to the storage of information across several 
trials performed within the same day, such as the radial arm maze (Baddeley, 2000).  
Finally, Baddely reports that in the field of artificial intelligence working memory refers 
to a system component, often unlimited in capacity, which is responsible for holding the 
productions.  For present purposes two general aspects of memory will be discussed to 
provide clarity on the way memory will be delineated.  The first aspect of memory 
examined is the difference between recall memory and recognition memory.  Recall 
memory is the ability to recall information without assistance whereas recognition 
memory is to be shown information and asked whether they had seen that information in 
the past.  Recognition and recall are often correlated from .45 to .65 depending on the 
method used to test for memory.  Because of the differences in rates of correlations, it has 
been hypothesized that recognition and recall are subsumed by different neural systems 
(Kahana, Rizzuto, & Schneider, 2005).   
In addition to recall, a second aspect of memory, the time of recall after initial 
exposure to the information will also be examined.  McGaugh (2000) reviewed the 
history of memory consolidation and he described three stages of memory consolidation: 
short-term (seconds to hours), long-term (hours to months), and long lasting memory 
(months to lifetime).  McGaugh reported that there exists a considerable overlap between 
the three stages of memory and he stated that the stages of memory are not sequential.  
His reasoning was derived from research demonstrating interaction effects of drugs 
administered at various times before, during, or after learning could impair memory 
consolidation for one stage but not another (McGaugh, 2000).  Due to the selective 
memory impairment findings produced by some drugs, he hypothesized that the stages of 
19 
 
memory consolidation are likely independent processes acting in parallel.  The 
implication for research in memory is the possibility that an experimental manipulation 
may affect one stage of memory more than others.  For example, Sharot and Phelps 
(2004), described below, demonstrated an effect upon long-term memory but not short-
term memory.   
Sharot and Phelps (2004) examined how attention and level and arousal modify 
memory for words over an extended period of time.  In their study, half of the 
participants were asked to complete a two-forced-choice recognition task immediately 
after being shown the words (short-term memory) while the other half were asked to 
complete the recognition task 24 hours after viewing the words (long-term memory).  
Sharot and Phelps found that arousing words were recognized to the same extent as less 
arousing or neutral words if participants were tested immediately following the 
experiment.  For those participants who were tested 24 hours later, neutral words were 
recognized less often than would have been immediately after testing.  More importantly, 
recognition memory for arousing words 24 hours later was equal to or superior to 
immediate memory.  Sharot and Phelps concluded that level of word arousal decreases 
the rate of memory decay but does not affect the initial memory for the word.  An 
alternative account is that the level of arousal affects a different stage of memory 
consolidation.  Regardless, this finding demonstrates that researchers should be aware 
that experiments could reveal different results depending on when participants are asked 
to recall information. 
At a more fundamental level, Anderson and Phelps (2001) examined how damage 
to the amygdala decreases the perception of aversive stimuli due to the role of the 
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amygdala in processing emotions.  They examined the ability of people to recall 
emotionally charged words versus neutral words.  Anderson and Phelps examined how 
damage to the amygdala affected the participants’ attentional blink (Raymond, Shapiro, 
& Arnell, 1992).  The “attentional blink” effect is the inability to distinguish a second 
target if it is presented too quickly after the first target.  Anderson and Phelps presented 
15 words per trial in a rapid sequence; there were 2 target words identified by being typed 
in a green font and 13 distractor words that were typed in a black font.  Previous research 
has demonstrated an “attentional blink” if the two targets are presented less than 600ms 
apart and if there were less than four intervening distractor items.  This is to say that the 
“attentional blink” effect caused individuals have a greatly impaired ability to identify the 
second target word though participants were able to remember the first target word.  
Anderson and Phelps (2001) and Anderson (2005) demonstrated that the presentation of 
high arousal words as the second target word greatly reduced the impairment normally 
associated with the “attentional blink”.  If the second target word was arousing, then the 
word was remembered even if presented within the time span of what normally would 
have been an attentional blink. 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was also used during the 
Anderson and Phelps (2001) experiment.  Specifically, they were interested in brain 
functioning when participants were asked to recall the second target word that was 
presented in each trial they were also using.  Following the completion of all the trials, 
Anderson and Phelps (2001) asked the participants to rate the level of emotion generated 
from reading a word presented to them.  Anderson and Phelps also asked participants to 
rate the level of arousal generated by each word.  They observed that the left amygdala 
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was more active when aversive words were presented to participants.  Anderson and 
Phelps used fMRI with one person who had a bilateral amygdala lobectomy, five people 
with left amygdala lobectomy, five people with right amygdala lobectomy, and 20 control 
participants.  Anderson and Phelps found that the one person with bilateral amygdala 
lobectomy and the five people with left amygdala lobectomy demonstrated no enhanced 
perception, no protection against the attentional blink, when they were presented with 
arousing word targets.  Individuals with left amygdala lobectomy were able to provide 
normal Likert-type scale ratings to aversive stimuli indicating that they had understood 
the affective meaning of words presented.  The difference between people with left 
amygdala lobectomies was that they did not demonstrate enhanced ability to perceive and 
hence remember emotionally aversive words. 
Summary 
This section identified a few critical features of memory and how it affects mood.  
Firstly, experimental manipulations could affect one stage of memory consolidation but 
not another.  This finding was attended to in this study by asking participants to provide 
recall of images immediately after the experiment, one day after presenting the images, 
and one week after presenting the images.  Second, there is evidence for mood congruent 
memory consolidation.  Finally, the studies examining “attentional blink” reinforce the 
first two findings by demonstrating the parallel processing of memory and emotions 
where emotions can direct perceptions.  Prior to examining how memory is related to 
moods, the following section will examine the various methods used by researchers to 
induce mood. 
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Mood Induction 
Mood induction for research purposes has been implemented in a controlled 
manner since Velten described his method of mood induction in 1968.  Although mood 
induction is widely used there are various methods used by researchers to accomplish 
mood induction of participants.  This section will provide an overview of some of the 
most popular mood induction techniques.  Then, findings regarding the type of mood 
induction and methods of mood induction will be examined.  This will establish that 
imagined mood induction used by Stones and Bygate (2009), is a quick and effective 
method of mood induction. 
Researchers have examined the effects of mood on behaviour using various 
strategies.  Some studies explore the function of naturally occurring mood differences 
while other studies examine experimentally induced mood.  Gerrards-Hesse, Spies, and 
Hesse (1994) provide background regarding the methods used to examine the effects of 
mood upon behaviour.  Mood may be studied as a naturally occurring variable.  When 
examining mood as a naturally occurring variable, the mood of participants is rated 
before any experimental procedures are conducted and the differences between 
participants are examined for correlations to mood differences (e.g., Parrott & Sabini, 
2990, Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  The effects of mood on behaviour have also been 
examined by comparing clinical populations (e.g., depressed people) against non-clinical 
populations (Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, & Gerdt, 1981).  In addition, the 
effects of mood can be examined by inducing the desired mood through experimental 
manipulation.   
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Gerrards-Hesse et al. (1994) reviewed five general categories of mood induction 
techniques for the effectiveness of mood induction.  Their review documented similar 
findings to the review by Westermann, Spies, Stahl, and Hesse (1996) who examined the 
effectiveness of 11 mood induction techniques.  Westermann et al. (1996) differentiate 
two of the following nine techniques by whether participants are provided with explicit 
instruction or not to attempt to get into the desired mood.  Each of the mood induction 
procedures will be briefly described followed by a description of the overall effectiveness 
for these procedures.  The 11 mood induction procedures were: 
1. Imagination.  Participants are asked to 
imagine emotion-ridden events.  To intensify this process, participants are 
asked to write down the imagined event and to write down their related 
thoughts and feelings.  For example, Wright and Mischel (1982) asked 
participants to as vividly as possible imagine a situation that would make them 
feel sad and to imagine the situation as vividly as possible. To induce a sad 
mood, participants in a study by Kavanagh and Bower (1985) were asked to 
remember an occasion when they had attempted a romantic approach to a 
member of the opposite sex and had failed and had been completely rejected. 
2. Velten.  This is the most widely used mood 
induction procedure (Westermann et al., 1996) and was developed by Velten 
(1968).  Participants are asked to read a list of 60 self-referent statements 
describing either positive/negative self-evaluations or somatic states.  
Participants are instructed to try to feel the mood generated by these 
statements (Velten, 1968).  
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3. Film/story mood induction (with and 
without instruction).  Participants are presented with a narrative or descriptive 
material to be imagined.  The procedure for instructions asks participants to 
get involved in the film or story described and the feelings that are suggested. 
For example, Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) induced a positive mood by 
asking participants to watch comedic bloopers and outtakes from the 
television westerns Gunsmoke and Have Gun Will Travel for five minutes.   
4. Music (with and without instruction).  
Participants are asked to listen to a piece of classical or modern music and 
asked to get into the mood of the piece (with instruction).  In some studies, 
participants are asked to choose a piece of music that will put them in the 
desired mood.  In the presentation of music without instruction, participants 
are asked to listen to a piece of music without emphasis on the emotional 
character of the piece.  An example of music with instruction was conducted 
by Eich and Metcalfe (1989) who asked participants to listen to a piece of 
classical music that to help them to develop a sad mood.  Furthermore, they 
informed participants that the music alone could not alone create the desired 
effect so the participants should concentrate on sad events. 
5. Feedback.  Some studies give participants 
positive or negative feedback on performance to induce a positive or negative 
mood.  Most often participants are provided with false feedback, although 
some studies use correct feedback.  For example, Parrot and Sabini (1990) 
used exam marks as the natural feedback mechanism.  They asked participants 
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to record the mark they think they achieved prior to obtaining their grades.  
This allowed researchers to compare their expected grades to their obtained 
grades.  They then requested that students write down a few memories from 
high school to examine how their moods were related to their memories.  
Their information was only requested at the end of the experiment and 
students were free not to submit their data.  It is noteworthy that 109 out of the 
233 students declined to submit their data (Parrott & Sabini, 1990). 
6. Social interaction.  For this mood induction 
procedure participants interact with a confederate who is instructed to act as if 
depressed or elated or neutral.  The assumption is that participants will be 
affected by the mood of the confederate and experience a similar mood 
experience. In an experiment by Yinon and Landau (1987) they provided 
subjects with the opportunity to “help” a friend of the experimenter by filling 
out an unrelated questionnaire.  Yinon and Landau (1990) hypothesized and 
confirmed that people feel good after helping others. 
7. Gift.  This method provides participants 
with a small gift (e.g., chocolate bar, gift certificate) which is expected to 
cause a degree of elation in participants.  A junior chocolate bar was used by 
Isen, Daubman & Norwiki, (1987) and successfully induced a positive affect. 
8. Facial expression.  Some researchers 
manipulate the facial expressions of the participants to induce a mood state.  
To obscure the nature of the experiment participants are often told that the 
task is designed to assess muscle activity while performing a cognitive task.  
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For instance, Srivastava, Sharma, and Mandal (2003) asked participants to 
look at sad faces to help them feel sad.  
9. Combined.  Some researchers use a 
combination of techniques to induce a mood state.  Some of the combinations 
used use Velten and imagination or Velten and music. 
  Westermann et al. (1996) reviewed 250 mood induction studies using the 
techniques previously described.  They found that for both positive and negative mood 
induction, the most effective technique was film or story, especially when participants 
were instructed to enter the desired mood state.  For a positive mood induction, all other 
mood induction procedures were less effective than the film/story technique.  For a 
negative mood induction, imagination, Velten, music, social interaction, and feedback 
were as effective as film/story without instruction.  The lack of studies examining the 
film/story with instruction procedure translated into larger ranges for a 95% confidence 
interval than other techniques, which suggests caution in interpreting this methods as 
more effective than other methods.  The authors concluded that except for facial 
expression, most methods are useful for the induction of negative moods.  The lack of 
support in facial expressions to induce moods is curious given the research of Ekman on 
facial features.    
Researchers often varied the implementation of the mood induction procedure.  
For example, Eich and Metcalfe (1989) employed a continuous music technique; during 
their experiment the mood inducing music is played throughout the experiment.  In that 
experiment, Eich and Metcalfe (1989) examined the change in mood induced by the 
continuous music technique versus the Velten technique before and after their 
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experiment.  They found that the Velten technique for mood induction was strong at the 
outset but had disappeared by the end of a 30-minute experiment, whereas the continuous 
music technique had the desired effect of producing a reliable mood shift for the duration 
of the experiment. 
Alternatively, Rusting and DeHart (2000) primed a negative emotion by using an 
imagination mood induction.  They asked participants to read a vignette that described a 
negative experience (a friend is terminally ill) and to imagine themselves in that situation.  
Rusting and Dehart (2000) reported that they used deception so that subjects did not 
guess that negative mood was important to the experiment.  Participants allocated to the 
negative mood induction condition were told that there were a variety of possible 
vignettes that were possible, when only one (the negative mood induction) was available.  
To increase the level of motivation of the participants for engaging in the vignette task, 
participants were asked to write down the vignette after they had read it.  One of Rusting 
and Dehart’s (2000) main findings was that the process of positive reappraisal negated 
the negative mood induction.  In fact, positive reappraisal caused participants to recall 
more positive memories, a mood-incongruent retrieval effect. 
Other researchers have examined how the presentation of stimuli affects the 
degree of mood caused by particular stimuli.  Baños et al. (2008) examined the 
differences in three dimensional presentation of visual stimuli versus two dimensional 
presentations of visual stimuli for inducing relaxed or positive emotions.  Baños et al. 
(2008) found no differences between the two methods of stimuli presentation for the 
induction of mood.  They also found no difference between the two methods for 
generating the intensity of arousal generated by the stimuli.  Another study also 
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demonstrated the stability of image ratings when visual material is manipulated.  Bradley 
Codispoti, Cuthbert, and Lang (2001) presented images in greyscale or in colour and 
found that there were no differences between the image presentations. 
Codispoti and De Cesarei (2007) examined the effect of picture size upon the 
affective responses of participants.  Codispoti and De Cesarei reported that there is a 
small but significant modulation of self-report affective response due to picture size.  
They found that as image size decreased, the affective rating of the pleasant images of 
erotic couples, opposite sex nudes, and babies decreased as did the affective ratings of 
neutral pictures.  Conversely, as the image size decreased there was a small but 
significant tendency to rate mutilated bodies and contaminations more negatively.  
Sánchez-Navarro, Martínez-Selva, Román, and Torrente (2006) also examined for the 
effects of image size upon mood ratings and found no differences in affective ratings or 
arousal ratings for displaying images in differing sizes.   
Summary 
This section examined the breadth of techniques used to generate mood in 
laboratory settings and demonstrated that most mood induction techniques are effective.  
Further, the mood induced by specific images in the IAPS catalogue is resilient to 
changes in size, shape, colour.  Taken together, these studies demonstrate that IAPS 
images are resistant to changes in hedonic valence and arousal level possibly indicating a 
Gestalt-like effect wherein the interpretation of each IAPS image is more important than 
the specific details of each image.  The next section will describe research on how mood 
induction studies have contributed to the understanding that memory is affected by 
moods. 
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Mood Induction and Memory 
Mood states have been induced by the experimenters wishing to examine the 
interaction between mood states and various cognitive processes, often memory.  The 
changes in mood that occur from mood induction are temporary and flexible and can be 
readily altered by the individual (Rustng & DeHart, 2000).  Mood has been demonstrated 
to enhance the ability to recall information when the induced mood state is present during 
the presentation of the items to be remembered.  Additionally, this finding of modulating 
memory consolidation has been found when moods are induced after the presentation of 
the items to be remembered.  A distinction between the two general methods of enhanced 
retrieval due to mood states, mood congruent memory and mood dependent memory 
(Weingartner, Miller, & Murphy, 1977), will also be presented. 
Positive and negative mood states can increase the ability of individuals to 
remember positive and negative events respectively (Haas & Canli, 2008).  There are two 
processes that describe the effects of mood upon memory, mood congruence and mood 
dependence (Blaney, 1986; Weingartner, Miller, & Murphy, 1977).  Mood congruence 
refers to the enhanced encoding or retrieval of a stimulus through the experience of a 
mood that is congruent with the target stimulus.  The congruent mood at the time of 
encoding or retrieval assists memory encoding or retrieval.  An example of mood 
congruence would be the increased likelihood of recall for a pleasant image if that person 
experienced a pleasant mood at the time of encoding the target stimulus.  A mood 
congruent memory effect would still be possible if a person had a neutral mood at the 
time of encoding but was experiencing a pleasant mood at the time of retrieval.  Mood 
dependence refers to the experience of a mood at both encoding and at retrieval that 
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enhances the ability to recall information irrespective to the affective valence of the 
recalled stimulus (Eich & Macaulay, 2000).  Similar to mood congruence, the mood at 
the time of viewing the image is important.  Moreover, for mood dependent memory the 
individual also needs to be experiencing the same mood at the time of retrieval.  In 
contrast to mood congruent memory in which the affective valence of the individual 
needs to be similar to the affective valence of the target stimulus, mood dependent 
memory is an increase in the ability to recall a target stimulus regardless of whether the 
affective valence of the stimulus matches the mood valence of the individual.  Most of 
the studies reviewed here provide mood congruent findings. 
The issue of external validity is raised when discussing the issue of mood 
induction.  Westermann et al. (1996) also discussed how demand characteristics could 
induce participants to guess the purpose of the experiment and act “as if” they were 
experiencing the anxious mood state.  They argued that the simulated mood state would 
adversely affect the external validity of study findings.  Further, it was suggested that the 
use of mood rating scales could increase the likelihood of demand characteristics due to 
the face validity of the questionnaires (Westermann et al. 1996).  Examining this very 
issue, Perrig and Perig (1988) examined if a simulated induced mood would demonstrate 
a mood congruent memory effect.  Participants in Perrig and Perrig (1988) first study 
read the following written instruction: “With a tape recorder a number of words will be 
presented to you. Your task is to study these words. Please behave in this learning task as 
if you were in a state of extreme happiness” (p. 104).  There are two interesting points 
about their simulated mood induction procedure.  First, Perrig and Perrig (1988) found 
that participants in the simulated positive mood condition recalled more positive moods 
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when asked to behave as if they were in a state of extreme happiness.  Their study 
demonstrated that a simulated mood could create mood congruent memory.  The second 
salient point demonstrated by Perrig and Perrig was that their mood induction procedure 
was very short.  This demonstrated that it is possible to induce moods quickly. 
  Eich and Macauley (2000) were intrigued by the Perrig and Perig (1988) study 
and wished to further examine whether simulated moods for mood congruent memory 
and mood dependent memory.  Perrig and Perrig (1988) had attempted but failed to find 
mood dependent memory in their study.  Eich and Macauley (2000) examined if 
simulated positive and simulated negative moods were different in how they affected 
mood congruent memory.  They found that positive moods produced a reliable mood 
congruent memory effect that was similar to mood induction studies using continuous 
music technique.  However, Eich and Macauley (2000) found that in the simulated sad 
condition, participants recalled more negative words than positive words.  This 
contradicted their earlier findings where they demonstrated negative moods provided 
asymmetrical mood congruent memory.  Eich and Macauley (2000) also found that 
simulated moods created larger memory effect of mood congruent memory.  Finally, Eich 
and Macauley (2000) found that simulated moods could not create mood dependent 
memory.  This final finding was puzzling given that mood congruent effects were more 
pronounced in simulated conditions rather than mood induced conditions.  The salient 
point from their study and from the study by Perrig and Perrig (1988) is that simulated 
moods can reliably produce mood congruent effects.  This study will be examining mood 
congruent memory thereby reducing the need to determine whether simulated or real 
emotions experienced. 
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Given the stated effectiveness of mood inductions, to have participants undergo a 
negative mood induction could seem as unsafe; however, studies have demonstrated the 
relatively short-lived duration of mood inductions.  Rusting and DeHart (2000) induced 
negative and positive moods at retrieval in several experimental designs and to examine 
the mood-congruent memory effect.  The memory task in their study was for participants 
to remember five events from their high school years.  When participants were 
experiencing a positive mood, they remembered more positive events and when 
participants were experiencing a negative mood they remembered more negative events.  
Further, Rusting and DeHart observed that mood-congruent retrieval was present when 
the participants maintained the induced mood and that mood-congruent retrieval was 
absent when participants lost the induced mood.  Participants in their study were able to 
ameliorate their negative mood by changing their thinking to reflect the opposite mood 
state and thereby not display any the negative mood-congruent memory effect.   
The ability of participants to mollify the effects of mood induction on recall 
demonstrates the ease and flexibility of participants to return to a baseline level of mood.  
This is in contrast to typical conceptual thinking of moods.  Mood states are often diffuse 
and enduring while emotions, in contrast, tend to be short-lived and directed at particular 
objects (Larsen, Berntson, Poehlmann, Ito, & Cacioppo, 2008).  While it may be more 
accurate to label “mood inductions” as “emotion inductions”, it could be argued that the 
purpose of the mood induction experiments is to simulate mood states.  Nonetheless, it is 
favourable that emotions generated from mood induction experiments are transient mood 
states that last for seconds or minutes rather than long lasting moods that can last for days 
or longer.  The short-lived moods provide a safer environment for participants.  The 
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flexibility or short-lived nature of emotions generated from mood inductions may better 
approximate real world instances of negative mood induction that would occur for the 
majority of people on a daily basis. 
Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, and Lang (2001) examined the influence of these 
two component factors upon human physiology.  In their study, Bradley et al. (2001) 
demonstrated the presentation of pleasant images induces modest increases in 
electrodermal activity and initial cardiac deceleration.  They also demonstrated that in 
contrast to unpleasant pictures, pleasant pictures are not equally arousing for individuals; 
that is, there is a greater variance in arousal scores for pleasant images.  They 
hypothesized that the degree of variation for arousal levels for pleasant images is likely 
related to the degree of deprivation associated with the pleasant image.  For example, a 
hungry person would report a greater arousal rating to an image of food.  Bradley et al. 
reported that the images rated as most unpleasant were pictures of mutilations, followed 
by pictures of human attack, accidents, loss, and illness.  Those images were rated as 
more unpleasant than pictures of contamination, pollution, and animal attack.  For the 
arousal levels of negative images, the images of human attack or animal attack were rated 
as more arousing than non-threatening images.  Bradley et al. (2001) reported that the 
participants rated the highest levels of pleasantness for viewing images of family scenes 
and rated the highest level of arousal for erotic images. 
When participants view IAPS images the initial physiological changes occur very 
quickly.  Junghöfer, Bradley, Elbert, and Lang (2001) found that when 700 IAPS images 
were presented at three or five a second, the normative arousal ratings of the IAPS 
images predicted event-related potentials (ERPs) as measured by electroencephalography 
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(EEG).   Junghöfer et al. observed that the emotional arousal differences occurred 
bilaterally over the occipital cortex and unilaterally over the right parietal cortex.  
Interestingly, participants in their study could not verbalize whether images were 
presented randomly or whether they were presented in blocks of different arousal levels.  
This lack of insight regarding item presentation was likely due to the fast presentation 
(200 or 333 ms per image).   
Junghöfer et al. also examined variables associated with IAPS image presentation.  
They varied the levels of colour, brightness, spatial frequency, and the complexity of the 
images (complexity was modified by compressing the images using the JPEG format).  
The physiological observations were not significantly different between high and low 
arousal states for any of these variables.  Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, McManis, and Lang 
(1998) examined how attentional resources affected the affected ratings of the IAPS 
images.  They measured startle responses by observing reflexive eye blinks to startle 
tones and they measured ERP using an EEG.  Half of the participants were asked to 
ignore the startle tone while the other participants were given a reaction time task 
whereupon they were asked to make a forced-choice decision concerning the startle 
tones.  They found that blink responses increased during the presentation of unpleasant 
images in comparison to pleasant images.  Cuthbert et al. found that participants had 
lower levels of EEG (P300) readings for arousing images (irrespective of hedonic 
valence) as opposed to low-arousal materials.  In summary, blink responses were affected 
by the hedonic valence of the image, and EEG readings were affected by arousal levels.  
With regard to attention, Cuthbert et al. found the biological measures were robust to 
demands on attention when viewing IAPS images.  Participants displayed the same 
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biological responses to images regardless of whether participants were engaged in a 
secondary task requiring timed forced choice decisions or whether their focus was 
entirely on the images.     
Other studies have also examined attention level.  Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, 
and Moscovitch (2007) examined how the level of attention affects emotion enhanced 
memory.  They coined the term emotion enhanced memory to describe the findings that 
arousing events are remembered better than neutral events.  The authors stated that the 
importance of attention or arousal depended on the hedonic valence from the stimuli.  
Talmi et al. examined the recall of items after either a 20 second delay or a 50 minute 
delay and found that negative but not positive emotions generated from the IAPS images 
enhanced memory for those images even in conditions requiring divided attention.  They 
concluded that for their study, the effect of positive emotion on memory was completely 
accounted for by the increased levels of attention.  They demonstrated that divided 
attention affected the memory of neutral stimuli but did not affect the memory for 
emotional stimuli, particularly for negative emotion stimuli.  In the previously described 
study by Sharot and Phelps (2004), the researchers examined how the participants’ were 
able to recognition memory of peripheral objects in a divided attention task and they 
found that the level of attention did not affect recognition memory.  Cutherbert et al. did 
not find any physiological effect of attention level by studying blink startle effects and 
P300 waves.  Therefore, attention level is not likely to be a strong confounding factor 
even though a basic level of attention is necessary to demonstrate emotion enhanced 
memory.  The lack of attention being a confounding factor may be due to a low-level 
orienting biological process involved for emotion enhanced memory.  
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Researchers have demonstrated that working memory can affect levels of 
emotional experience generated when viewing the IAPS images.  Van Dillen and Koole 
(2007) varied the loads of working memory when participants were viewing pictures 
from the IAPS.  They found that as working memory loads were increased, participants 
were less likely to feel a mood difference when comparing very negative images to 
slightly negative images.  Their results indicate that the extent of negative hedonic 
valence was altered but the hedonic valence from the images were not eliminated nor 
were they changed to neutral.  Further, their results were limited to demonstrating that 
working memory affected hedonic valence ratings, they did not demonstrate that it 
affected memory.  This study demonstrates that even under high working memory loads 
images with negative hedonic valence will still be considered negative. 
Anderson, Wais, and Gabrieli (2006) examined the function of emotional arousal 
following the presentation of neutral images.  The authors induced a negative mood 
following the presentation of neutral faces or neutral houses, by showing participants 
images from the IAPS library that were emotionally negative arousing scenes, 
emotionally positive arousing scenes, or emotionally neutral scenes.  After a one week 
delay, they asked participants to complete a recognition test regarding the images they 
had seen.  For participants whose positive or negative emotions were aroused 
immediately following the presentation of neutral scenes, their recognition rate of the 
preceding neutral pictures or houses was improved (Anderson et al., 2006).  Due to the 
similar memory modulation effect that both positive and negative images had upon 
preceding neutral events, the authors collapsed the positive and negative valence images 
and sorted them by degree of emotional arousal for their statistical analyses.  The authors 
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had designed the study to minimize any carry-over effects between trials of the IAPS 
images by adding a flanker task and ensuring that the minimum duration of a trial would 
be between 23 and 28 seconds.  Anderson et al. also examined the effect of novel neutral 
arousal or novel positive arousal post picture presentation would affect memory and they 
found that novelty without arousal was not sufficient to improve recall or recollection.   
The study by Anderson et al. (2006) is important because it is the first to 
demonstrate that emotionally arousing images can enhance the recognition memory of a 
preceding neutral image (McGaugh, 2006).  Anderson et al. provide evidence for 
retrograde memory enhancement.  One week following the presentation of paired neutral 
and negative items, the neutral items were recalled with greater success.  This means that 
memories of images that have neutral hedonic valences can be enhanced by negative 
emotions that immediately follow the image.  It also indicates that future studies must be 
aware of the potential consequences of having short intervals between serially presented 
stimuli and should control for this by changing the study design or by choosing the 
appropriate statistics for interpretation of the data. 
Negative stimuli again demonstrated an influence upon retrograde memory 
enhancement in a study by Finn and Roediger (2012).  In their experiment, they asked 
participants to study lists of Swahili-English translations and then recall the English 
translation of a Swahili word following the study period.  If participants correctly recalled 
a translation, they were presented with a blank screen, a neutral image, or an emotionally 
negative high arousal image.  The image was present on the screen for 500ms.  The 
neutral and negative images were taken from the IAPS (Lang et al., 1993).  Following 10 
lists of 10 word pairs, participants were asked to recall as many of the translations as 
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possible to indicate their memory for words.  Finn and Roediger (2012) conducted this 
experiment with three different groups of people.  Experiment 1 presented the images 
immediately after recall while in Experiment 2 images were presented two seconds after 
recall.  For Experiment 3 participants were asked to restudy the words on a screen (rather 
than given a recall test) that were immediately followed by a blank screen, a neutral 
image, or an image with negative hedonic valence and high arousal.  Finn and Roediger 
found that participants in Experiment 1 and 2 had a greater recall of vocabulary when 
presented with negative and high arousal images.  Experiment 3 did not demonstrate any 
differences between types of images presented to the participants.  The authors suggest 
that active retrieval is necessary for the participants to experience any benefit from highly 
negative and highly arousing images.  This study again demonstrates the retrograde 
memory enhancement for negative stimuli using recall memory. 
Atienza and Cantero (2008) investigated how sleep and emotions affect recall and 
recognition tasks.  They asked half their participants to not sleep the night after they had 
been exposed to the emotional and non-emotional words.  A week later, participants were 
tested for recall and recognition memory using the remember-know procedure.  The 
remember-know procedure (Tulving, 1985) asks participants to view images and to state 
whether the image is new, remembered (considered to be recall memory), or known 
(considered to be recognition memory).  Atienza and Cantero (2008) found that 
emotional images were remembered better than neutral images even when participants 
were sleep deprived the night following the experiment.  Recall of images was affected 
by lack of sleep, but recognition memory was not.  They also found that high arousal 
positive pictures were remembered better than 18% of the high arousal negative pictures 
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(Atienza & Cantero, 2008).  Curiously, Atienza and Cantero elected to only have 40% of 
their picture stimulus come from the IAPS image database although they did testing to 
normalize their own image set.  This finding from Atienza and Cantero is similar to the 
findings from Anderson et al. (2006) who found an effect for positive and negative 
images but not for neutral images. 
Studies have also been examined gender differences to determine if gender 
differences affect mood and memory.  Anderson et al. (2006) did not find any gender 
differences in their study suggesting that for their recognition ability, men and women are 
affected by emotional induction to the same degree.  Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, and 
Lang (2001) also examined gender differences in rating the IAPS images.  Bradley, 
Codispoti, Sabatinelli, and Lang (2001) wished to examine gender differences by 
comparing biological differences to socio-cultural differences by comparing 
electrodermal ratings and cardiac speed (less sensitive to cultural processes) to facial 
expressions and judgement scores respectively (more sensitive to socio-cultural 
processes).  Overall, they found that men and women rated the images similarly, although 
there were some sex differences.  Women tended to react to unpleasant and arousing 
pictures more negatively, while men tend to be more aroused by erotic imagery.  There 
was concordance between biological measures and socio-cultural measures.  This high 
concordance rate between physiological ratings and self-report ratings provides evidence 
suggesting that participants in their study were open and accurate in describing their 
responses to the images.  Consequently, Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, and Lang 
suggest that these differences in image meaning between men and women are largely 
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biological.  Nevertheless, they state that cross cultural studies would be beneficial to 
identify if differences are biological, socio-cultural, or a combination of both.  
Stones and Bygate (2009) examined how mood induction would affect the 
memory for IAPS images.  They induced a slightly anxious mood in half of their 
participants and displayed 57 images for six seconds each.  They asked participants to 
rate the hedonic valence and the arousal level of each image as it was presented.  They 
found that in general, high arousal items were recalled more frequently than low arousal 
items.  Stones and Bygate reported that participants who had experienced an anxious 
mood induction recalled more unpleasant photographs.  In addition, participants who had 
experienced an anxious mood induction rated the images more negatively, indicating that 
the mood induction was successful.  
Summary 
The literature in this section provides some background describing how moods 
affect memory.  Research has demonstrated that moods have an effect upon memory 
especially for negative valence emotions and high arousal states that are generated from 
viewing IAPS images.  Additionally, it also seems that the IAPS images affect men and 
women roughly equally.  Next, an examination of individual differences will demonstrate 
how personality factors may be important in moderating the effectiveness of mood 
induction and thereby moderating the effectiveness of emotion enhanced memory.   
Personality 
Sojka and Guise (2006) examined how mood and cognition affect how people like 
an advertisement and how they like a brand.  They measured mood using an 11-item 
Likert-type scale that asked people to identify their level of affinity for affect.  Sojka and 
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Guise measured cognitive style using The Need For Cognition Scale.  They found that 
people who described themselves as high affect type responded more favourably to visual 
stimuli.  They also found that scores for both self-described affect affinity and need for 
cognition were correlated with responding more favourably to visual or verbal stimuli.  
Another study also demonstrated that people with higher levels of Neuroticism were 
more attentive to negative self-relevant information and Neuroticism (Reed & 
Derryberry, 1996).  These studies provide some support for how personality traits affect 
personal choice.  This section will provide an overview of the definition of personality 
traits followed by research describing how personality traits are relevant when 
investigating mood and memory. 
There are various ways to classify normal personality functioning.  The five-
factor model was empirically developed using a lexical approach.  In 1933 Thurstone 
stated that a list of 60 personality adjectives could be accounted for by the use of five 
factors (Digman, 1996).  However, Thurstone did not follow up on this line of research 
and instead developed his own questionnaire, the Thurstone Temperament Schedule 
(Digman, 1996).  Thurstone was the first to identify five factors but other researchers had 
also been working to identify personality factors that could explain human behaviour.  
Cattell and Eysenck developed the other notable conceptualizations of personality that 
were being developed in the early 20
th
 century.  Hans Eysenck developed his version of 
personality factors in the 1940s outlining three factors – extraversion, neuroticism, and 
psychoticism.  Eysenck’s factor of psychoticism has been described as a combination of 
conscientiousness and agreeableness (Digman, 1996).  Cattell also began identifying 
personality factors in the 1940s and categorized personality functioning into 11 
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personality factors (Catell, 1947).  Cattell eventually settled on 16 personality traits and 
developed the 16 PF Personality Questionnaire, which identifies 16 personality factors.  
Goldberg (1990) has argued that only five personality traits of Cattell’s 16 have been able 
to be replicated as independent factors.  Goldberg describes these five personality traits as 
the “big-five”.  The big-five personality traits as described by Goldberg (1992) are: 
surgency (or extraversion), agreeableness, conscientiousness (or dependability), 
emotional stability (vs. neuroticism), and culture (or intellect or openness).   
Personality factors have demonstrated predictive validity for many factors.  
Wilson, Krueger, Gu, et al. (2008) followed 6158 people aged 65 and older for a period 
of six years.  They wished to examine if there was any correlation between morbidity and 
the personality traits of neuroticism and extraversion.  To measure neuroticism, Wilson et 
al. used four items from the NEO-PI-R neuroticism scale (items 1, 21, 36, and 51).  To 
measure extraversion, they used four items from the NEO-PI-R extraversion scale (items 
2, 7, 27, and 32).  For both brief versions of the scales, scores ranged from 0 to 48.  To 
examine the validity of the brief four question measure of personality, the authors 
examined 903 older adults and compared their responses to the four questions to the 
broader 12 items.  The correlation between the brief and standard measures was 0.83 for 
neuroticism and 0.84 for extraversion.  After six years 2430 (39.5%) of the participants 
had died.  Wilson et al. found that for each point of neuroticism there was a 1.6% 
elevated risk of death; for each point of extraversion there was a 1.6% decrease risk of 
death.  However, the authors reanalyzed the data to control for cognition, level of 
socializing, and activity patterns.  When these variables were controlled, the level of 
elevated risk for neuroticism was reduced by 54% and the elevated benefit of 
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extraversion was reduced by 54%.  This study by Wilson et al. demonstrates a few 
important facets of normal personality testing.  Firstly, personality measures are 
correlated with mortality rates.  Second, is that it demonstrates that even very short 
versions of the NEO-PI-R have adequate validity.  Research regarding the links between 
personality, mood, and memory will be described next. 
Bienvenu, Samuels, Costa, et al. (2004) examined the relationships between 
normal personality functioning and a lifetime history of mental health issues.  They 
examined the correlations between psychiatrist diagnoses using the Schedules for Clinical 
Assessment in Neuropsychiatry (SCAN; Wing et al., 1990) and the Revised NEO 
Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) for 798 participants.  
Bienvenu et al. correlated the psychiatric diagnoses with the NEO-PI-R profiles.  They 
found that simple phobia, panic disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder were 
correlated with higher scores of neuroticism.  Social phobia and agoraphobia were 
correlated high neuroticism and low extraversion.  Obsessive compulsive disorder was 
correlated with high neuroticism, high openness.  Major depressive disorder was 
correlated with high neuroticism and dysthymia was correlated with a high neuroticism 
and a low extraversion.  Other authors have examined how personality traits as measured 
by the NEO-PI-R were correlated to anxiety sensitivity (Cox, Borger, Taylor, Fuentes, & 
Ross, 1999).  They found that anxiety sensitivity was correlated with high levels of 
neuroticism and low levels of extraversion.  Cox et al. (1999) hypothesized that anxiety 
sensitivity could make some people more susceptible for mood induction.  They believed 
that inducing moods could possibly lead to better memory. 
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Bienvenu et al. (2004) reported that the research literature has been consistent in 
demonstrating changes in normal personality functioning (higher neuroticism scores) 
while people are experiencing major depressive disorder than during symptom remission.  
This is particularly important because it may be demonstrated that people who have 
higher scores of neuroticism, which is normal for mental health disorders, have a greater 
/better memory for images that are negative.  This would indicate that mental health 
clients are inclined to remember negative events, which could act to sustain the disorder. 
Hooker, Verosky, Miyakawa, Knight, and D’Espisito et al. (2008) examined the 
neurological activation during fear and reward conditioning in addition to personality 
correlates.  These authors used the five-factor model, specifically examining the role of 
neuroticism and extroversion.  Historically high neuroticism was associated with 
increased sensitivity to punishment and a tendency to feel negative (Eysynk, 1967).  
However, Hooker et al. reported there has been little success in replicating this 
association.  High extroversion is associated with increased sensitivity to reward resulting 
in greater risk in developing addiction disorders (Eysenck, 1967).  Hooker et al. (2008) 
used the 44-question Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999) to measure 
neuroticism and extroversion.  They analyzed responses to happy, fearful, and neutral 
stimuli and examined 12 participants’ ability to learn while being scanned with an fMRI 
(Hooker et al., 2008).  The results from the fMRI demonstrated that high neuroticism was 
correlated with increased activity in the amygdala during fear learning, whereas, low 
extraversion was associated to greater amygdala activity during happy learning.  The 
authors reported that they did not measure arousal.  Hooker et al. hypothesized that low 
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extraversion may be related to a low basal level of arousal and that this low level of 
arousal may provide an advantage for learning (in certain contexts). 
A study by LaRowe, Patrick, Curtain, and Kline (2006) supports this optimal 
arousal learning paradigm.  LaRowe et al. found that extraversion was correlated with 
quicker habituation to an acoustic startle.  The acoustic startle could be considered as a 
higher level of arousal and thereby requiring a higher basal arousal rate as suggested is 
need using the Optimal Arousal Theory. 
Canli, Sivers, Whitfield, Gotlib, and Gabrieli (2002) demonstrated that 
extroversion is related to the degree of activation in the amygdala when presented with 
happy pictures.  The higher the level of extroversion measured in participants, the greater 
the activation in the amygdala when presented with happy pictures.  In addition, the 
authors demonstrated that the amygdala activation for negative pictures was not affected 
by extraversion scores.  The authors did not detect any differences due to neuroticism 
scores, unlike the study by Hooker et al (2008).  Canli et al. (2002) reported that this 
finding demonstrates the need for researchers to control for personality characteristics.   
Using an fMRI Canli et al. (2001) examined if brain reactivity to emotional 
stimuli was correlated with personality traits.  The authors used the NEO-FFI to measure 
personality traits.  Canli et al. found that extraversion correlated significantly with brain 
reactivity to positive images in the brain regions of the amygdala (r = 0.79), middle 
frontal gyrus (r = 0.79), caudate (r = 0.84), and putamen (r = 0.86).  Neuroticism 
correlated significantly with brain activity to negative images in the brain regions of the 
middle frontal gyrus (r = 0.75) and middle temporal gyrus (r = 0.79).  The described 
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correlations were relative to positive pictures (for extraversion) and negative pictures (for 
neuroticism), as no neutral images were presented to the participants.   
Personality has been demonstrated to be correlated with attention.  Using an fMRI 
Amin, Constable, and Canli (2004) examined participants’ performance in a dot-probe 
task.  The dot-probe task presents participants with two images, where one of the images 
hides a dot-probe that is revealed as both images are removed.  A fast response time 
indicates that participants were attending to the image associated with the hidden 
stimulus while a slow response time indicates that participants were attending to the other 
image.  Personality was measured personality using the NEO-Five Factor Inventory 
(NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992) and images were selected from the IAPS and 
included positive, negative, and neutral items.  Amin et al. (2004) found that people with 
high Extraversion scores had faster response times when the stimulus was placed behind 
a neutral stimulus rather than a negative stimulus.  They surmised that elevated 
extraversion scores are associated with an aversion to negative stimulus.  The area of the 
brain active for high E individuals was the right fusiform gyrus; which the authors 
explained as an increased effort in visual search.  Amin et al. reported that Neuroticism 
was not correlated with any findings at the chosen level of statistical significance of p < 
0.001.  Amin et al. conjectured that this may have been due to their participant sample 
(11 people, 5 who had the same neuroticism score).  When the authors examined 
relationships at a p < 0.01 they found other regions were related to E was associated with 
greater anterior cingulate and amygdala activation when the dot-probe was hidden by the 
positive item of a positive/neutral pair.  At a p < 0.01 level they also found that 
Neuroticism was associated with anterior cingulate activation when the dot-probe was 
47 
 
hidden by the negative item of a negative/neutral pair.  These additional findings, while 
not significant a-priori, suggest that people high in Neuroticism attend more to negative 
information and that people high in Extraversion attend more to positive information. 
Norris, Larsen, and Cacioppo (2007) measured skin conductance reactivity as a 
function of neuroticism and extraversion for emotionally evocative pictures.  Norris et al. 
(2007) used the 40 items from Goldberg’s (1992) Big 5 Personality Dimensions scale that 
measured neuroticism and extraversion.  Norris et al. then presented 66 pictures from 
IAPS – 22 most negative pictures, 22 neutral pictures, and 22 most positive pictures.  
Neuroticism was correlated with skin conductance but extraversion was not.  Participants 
with higher neuroticism scores demonstrated greater skin reactivity to both positive and 
negative images.  Further, the duration of skin reactivity was longer for people high in 
neuroticism indicating that their physiological arousal from both positive and negative 
images was more prolonged. 
Summary 
The big five personality variables have been used to demonstrate how individual 
traits are related to performance.  These previous studies have demonstrated that 
Neuroticism is correlated with changes in outcome when presented with negative stimuli 
while Extraversion is correlated with positive stimuli.  The studies in the section have 
confirmed that personality traits can influence mood and memory.  The inclusion of 
personality traits may provide additional information regarding an individual’s memory 
for images. 
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Hypotheses 
Anderson (2005) wrote that “if the focusing of attention represents a prioritizing 
of information processing, then the allocation of resources should be tightly coupled with 
information of biological or motivational import to the organism” (p.  258).  The aims of 
this study include the replication and extension of findings by Stones and Bygate (2009).  
These authors reported that while experiencing a negative mood at the time of study, (1) 
more negative images were later recalled than non-negative images, (2) high arousal 
images were recalled more frequently than low arousal images, and (3) participants who 
had experienced an anxious mood induction rated the images more negatively and 
recalled more unpleasant than pleasant images.  The present study included measurement 
of personality traits, which are hypothesized to affect valence and arousal ratings of 
images and moderate the effects of mood induction.  The previous literature suggests the 
following model (Figure 4) of recall for images.   
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Figure 4.  A model of the expected effects of intervention, personality traits, and 
image characteristics upon recall. 
 
This model hypothesises four general areas that influence the dependent variable, item 
recall.  Based on this model, developed from the findings of the literature review, the 
following main hypotheses and secondary hypotheses were tested.   
Image Characteristics 
1. The hedonic valence of the images will be 
correlated with image recall.  Stones and Bygate (2009) found that recall 
correlated with the hedonic valence of the IAPS images.  Specifically, they 
found a “J-shaped” curve for the negative mood induction group where 
images with a negative hedonic valence were recalled with greater frequency 
than images with a positive hedonic valence, which in turn were recalled with 
greater frequency than images with a neutral hedonic valence.  Stones and 
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Bygate found a “U-shaped” curve for recall of images in the control group 
(negative and positive IAPS items were recalled equally well and superior to 
neutral IAPS items). 
2. Images described as having higher levels of 
arousal will be more likely to be recalled, replicating one of the findings from 
the Stones and Bygate (2009) study. 
Intervention 
3. Participants who undergo a negative mood 
induction will rate all images with a more negative hedonic valence.  These 
findings are expected to follow similar findings from the previous study by 
Stones and Bygate (2009). 
4. Participants in the negative mood induction 
condition will recall negative images better than positive images.  This 
hypothesis is supported by evidence that mood congruent events are better 
remembered (e.g., Haas & Canli, 2008; Rusting and DeHart, 2000).  For 
example, the study by Stones and Bygate (2009) demonstrated that 
participants who had experienced a negative mood induction recalled more 
unpleasant images followed by pleasant images and finally neutral images. 
Personality Traits 
5. The 45° counter clockwise rotation of the 
circumplex model provides measures of positive and negative affect.  
Negative affect has been correlated with Neuroticism (Watson & Clark, 1994).  
Research has demonstrated the enhanced memorability of negative images 
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(e.g., Stones & Bygate, 2009) and negative affect is experienced more 
frequently by people with high Neuroticism (Bienvenu et al., 2004; Cox et al., 
1999); consequently, it is hypothesised that participants with high neuroticism 
scale scores will report higher negative ratings to the IAPS images in the 
negative induced mood condition than in the control condition.  This 
hypothesis is related to the personality construct that describes people with 
high neuroticism scale scores as being more emotionally labile.  
6. Further, participants with high neuroticism 
scale scores will recall unpleasant photographs with a greater frequency in the 
negative mood induction condition than participants with low neuroticism 
scale (Canli et al, 2002; Hooker et al., 2008).    
7. Extroversion has been correlated with 
positive affect as measured by the PANAS (Watson & Clark, 1994).  
Accordingly, participants with high extroversion scale scores will report 
positive pictures as more positive than participants with low extraversion 
scores.  Extraversion has long been linked to the experience of positive 
emotions.   
8. Research has demonstrated that people with 
high extraversion scale scores may also have higher base arousal rates (Amin 
et al., 2004; Canli et al., 2002).  If extraverts do have higher base arousals 
rates it could be that participants scoring high in extroversion will demonstrate 
enhanced memory for high arousal images irrespective of hedonic valence 
relative to participants scoring low in extroversion; whereas people with high 
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neuroticism may recall high arousal high negative hedonic valence images 
with a greater frequency than individuals with low neuroticism scale scores. 
Memorabilitiy 
9. Recall rates tested 24 hours and 1 week after 
testing will demonstrate robustness to memory decay in the experimental 
condition.  This reduced memory decay for images is expected to be positively 
correlated with scale score for neuroticism in both conditions for images rated 
as negative and arousing.  Individuals with higher neuroticism are expected to 
have attention to negative information and therefore may display greater 
memory consolidation for negative and arousing images (Hooker et al., 2008).   
Method 
All procedures used were approved by the Lakehead University Ethics Board.  
Bonus points for Introductory Psychology students were approved by the Lakehead 
University Psychology Department.   
Participants  
Participants included university students enrolled in psychology courses (51 
women and 24 men; mean age = 22.37 years) and people from the community (17 
women and 9 men; mean age = 30.58 years).  Students enrolled in a first year psychology 
course were awarded two extra percentage marks of extra credit for participation in the 
study.  All other participants were entered into a draw for a $100 gift certificate from 
Walmart.  
Materials 
The NEO Five-Factor Inventory 
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The NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992) is a 60 item 
questionnaire that measures five broad domains of personality functioning.  The NEO-
FFI is a shortened form of the NEO Personality Inventory – Revised (NEO-PI-R, Costa & 
McCrae, 1992), which is a 240 item questionnaire.  The NEO-FFI measures the 
personality factors of neuroticism (N), extraversion (E), openness to experience (O), 
agreeableness (A), and conscientiousness (C).  The NEO-FFI takes approximately 10 to 
15 minutes to complete.  The global factors are independently assessed with five 12-item 
scales.  There have been some criticisms of the NEO-FFI by Deary et al. (1996) who 
found that the N scale of the NEO-FFI correlated with Extraversion and 
Conscientiousness.  However, by December 2006 it was used in over 615 scientific 
studies (McCrae & Costa, 2007).  The median internal consistency was reported as .80 
(Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
The NEO-PI was developed with six principles in mind.  The first principle was 
the idea that there is a hierarchical structure to personality traits.  The second was that the 
basis for the development of the personality traits was from the psychological literature.  
The third principle was that items were generated using a rational scale construction.  The 
fourth principle was to develop the scale using psychometric principles.  The fifth 
principle was to develop a parallel form to avoid the reliance on self-report.  The sixth 
principle was of construct validation.  Costa and McCrae (1992) examined the validity of 
the NEO-FFI by comparing results to NEO-PI-R responses obtained three years earlier by 
the same participants.  They found that the correlations for the between the two measures 
over a three year period was .62 (N), .60 (E), .56 (O), .57 (A), and .61 (C).   
The International Affective Picture Study 
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Fifty-seven images were selected from the International Affective Picture Study 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) for use in this study.  The pictures chosen were 
the same as those used by Stones and Bygate (2009) who demonstrated that mood 
induction affected picture recall.  The pictures consist of 19 unpleasant, 19 pleasant, and 
19 neutral images (see Appendix A for description of the images and their respective 
mean ratings for hedonic valence and arousal level).  Participants viewed images from 
one of two laptops monitors.   Images were displayed from a distance of 50 to 75 cm 
from a 17” monitor displaying images at 1440x900 pixels or from an 11.6” monitor at 
1376 x 768 pixels.   
The hedonic valence and arousal ratings of the images were rated on 9-point 
Likert-type scales.  The norms were developed in 14 separate studies involving 60 
pictures each.  Norms were developed for each picture 1) averaged across all subject, 2) 
averaged across male subjects, and 3) averaged across female subjects.  Appendix A 
contains the averaged norms for all subjects, male and female.  These norms were used to 
choose the images for the study and were not be used in the analyses.  Participants were 
be asked to rate each image and those ratings were used for the analyses. 
Procedure 
Session 1.  Prior to participation people were provided information regarding the 
nature of the experiment (see Appendix B).  Participants were then asked to read and sign 
the consent form (Appendix C).  Next, participants were asked to complete the NEO-FFI.  
Half of the participants (N = 51) were randomly assigned to the mood induction condition 
and the other half (N = 50) were assigned to the control condition.  
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The mood induction procedure was the same as the method used by Stones and 
Bygate (2009).  The mood induction was the imagination-type, which was previously 
described as being efficacious.  Stones and Bygate (2009) demonstrated that it was an 
effective procedure for producing differences in mood induction.  Participants who were 
randomly assigned to the mood induction condition were asked to complete two open 
ended questions: 1) “What will physically happen to you when you die?” and 2) “What 
emotions did the thoughts of dying elicit?”  Participants in the control condition were 
asked to think about the same questions in regards to their thoughts about their next meal, 
a relatively neutral topic, as a substitute of for thoughts of their death.  These questions 
were derived from a study by Landau et al. (2006) who asked participants to rate pieces 
of art.  Participants were randomly assigned to a death salience condition or the control 
condition (asking them to write about their next exam).  Landau et al. found that 
participants rated art work as less attractive than people in the control condition. 
Participants were then provided instructions (Appendix D) that described the 
computer presentation of images and how to rate each image.  Participants were provided 
with the instructions to read as they were being read aloud by the experimenter, which 
took approximately five minutes.  The text for the instructions was taken from the IAPS 
instructions for rating images.  Participants were informed that for each image they would 
be asked to rate the level of valence they experienced from viewing the image and the 
level of arousal they experienced from viewing the image.  Following the reading of 
instructions participants were asked to rate their current mood using a 1 to 9 Likert-type 
scale, with the anchors of unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant.  They were also asked to rate 
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their level of arousal using a 1 to 9 Likert-type scale, with the anchors of calm and 
excited (see Appendix E for the mood and arousal rating scales).   
Having participants rate their moods using a Likert-type scale following 
instructions was deliberate.  Rather than taking mood ratings immediately following 
mood induction, ratings were recorded following the instructions to examine how 
participants felt after a few minutes of instruction, an event with an assumed neutral 
hedonic valence.  The use of a Likert-type measure for mood and arousal following 
instruction to participants was to reduce the formation of demand characteristics which 
could diminish the external validity of the study (Westermann et al., 1996).  Additionally, 
asking participants their mood and arousal levels prior to seeing images provided 
participants with a practice in how to use the Likert-type scales to rate the images that 
were to follow.  Using this method to identify mood will also replicate the procedure used 
by Stones and Bygate (2009). 
Participants were then shown 59 images from the International Affective Picture 
Survey (IAPS) library over a computer monitor one at a time.  The first two images were 
examples meant to accustom participants to the experiment.  It took participants 
approximately 30 minutes to complete this section of the experiment.  There were three 
orders of image presentation; one order was randomly selected for each participant.  The 
first two practice example images were identical in each presentation order and they were 
not included in the final analyses.  Each order of image presentation consisted of 19 sets 
of three images for a total of 57 images.  The three images in each set were comprised of 
IAPS images from each of the standardized hedonic valence categories; one image from 
the negative hedonic rating set of images, one image from the positive hedonic rating set 
57 
 
of images, and one image from the neutral hedonic rating set of images.  Presenting the 
images in this manner was done to ensure that images from each hedonic valence 
category were displayed equally throughout the experiment.  This minimized any 
potential confounding effects that could arise due to a succession of negative or positive 
images, which could have exaggerated the effects of hedonic rating.  This presentation 
also minimized any confounding effects that could occur due to having a preponderance 
of positive or negative items at the beginning or end of the experiment, which could have 
influenced recall via serial position effect (Ebbinghaus, 1885). 
Each IAPS image was displayed for six seconds after which time the image was 
removed.  Two questions then appeared on the screen and participants were asked to rate 
the image on a 9-point Likert-type scale.  Participants were asked to rate the images with 
the questions “How pleasant was the image you just saw?” and “How arousing was the 
image you just saw?” (See Appendix E).  The questions were displayed for 14 seconds 
before the questions were removed from the screen and the experiment proceeded with 
the following image.  The participant indicated their answers to these questions on a 
separate piece of paper, identified by their participant group (1 = control group, 2 = mood 
induction group), the presentation order (a, b, or c), and participant number (01 to 103).  
Each image was displayed for six seconds and was followed by a request for the 
participants to rate the hedonic valence and arousal of the preceding image.  This 
continued until all images have been displayed.  This technique of rating images 
immediately after presentation is standard procedure for rating IAPS images and it was 
also the procedure used by Stones and Bygate (2009); therefore, it was not expected to 
affect the mood induction effectiveness.  Further, immediately rating the images could 
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provide information regarding the strength and duration of mood induction, by comparing 
the image ratings between the mood induction group and the control group as the 
experiment progresses over the 57 images.   
Following the presentation of images, participants were asked to rate their mood 
and level of arousal using the questions in Appendix E.  This rating was used to examine 
any effects of the mood induction that may have remained by the end of the experiment.  
Next, participants were asked to recall as many photographs as they could remember by 
providing written descriptions of the images.  Participants were given the opportunity to 
submit their names and addresses for a mailed summary of the findings from the 
experiment, which were kept separate from their experimental responses so as to 
maintain anonymity. 
Participants were then invited to participate in two more sessions that were to be 
done online from any computer with an internet connection.  They were informed that 
each session would take approximately 15 minutes and that they were free to decline the 
participation without prejudice if they wish.  They were informed that if they chose to 
participate further they would receive two emails.  The first email would be sent to them 
approximately 24 hours after the initial session and would provide a link to follow for the 
online website where they would be asked a few questions about the experiment.  The 
second email would be sent one week after the initial session and would have a similar 
link with similar questions.  If participants instead chose to decline further participation, 
they were thanked for their time and provided with a debriefing form (see Appendix G).  
All but one participant agreed to partake in the second and third sessions, and they 
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submitted their email addresses to be contacted with further information.  Total time of 
participation for Session 1 was approximately one hour.  
Session 2.  Twenty-four hours after participants have completed session 1, an 
email was sent to the 100 participants who agreed to take part in the second experiment.  
Of the initial 101 people who participated in Session 1, 92 people (91.1%) completed 
session 2.  The email provided participants with a link to an individualized webpage to 
answer a few questions at www.surveymonkey.com.  The survey asked participants for 
their participant number, which was included in the email to them and was used as a 
double check to verify the identity of the respondent.  They were then asked to rate their 
current mood and arousal levels using the questions in Appendix E.  Next, participants 
were asked to recall as many of the 57 images as they could.  Finally, participants were 
asked if they wish to participate in the third and final questionnaire.  If they choose not to 
participate in Session 3, no further email was sent, the person will be thanked for their 
participation, and the person was provided with debriefing information that could be 
printed (see Appendix G).  This took participants approximately 10 minutes. 
There were a few reasons to use SurveyMonkey to capture responses rather than 
asking participants to reply in an email.  First, the use of SurveyMonkey allowed for 
anonymity of responses, as compared to an email response that would include identifying 
information.  Second, SurveyMonkey allows for contingencies management.  For 
example, if a participant declined further participation then the survey tool provided 
participants with the debriefing form (Appendix G) which was printable.  The survey tool 
also prevented participants from accessing the questionnaire twice; the link provided 
brought them to a unique webpage which could only work once.  Finally, SurveyMonkey 
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provided a time of start and time of completion for the questionnaire.  The completion 
time was used to calculate the time lapse between initial presentation and the following 
two sessions. 
Session 3.  One week after participants completed Session 1, an email was sent to 
them asking them to visit a webpage to answer a few questions.  This only occurred if 
they have agreed to continued participation at the end of session 2.  Of the 92 people who 
completed session 2 and who elected to proceed, 75 people (81.52%) completed Session 
3.  Therefore, 74.25% of the original 101 participants in Session 1 completed all three 
sessions.  In Session 3 the email link directed participants to their own unique page on 
SurveyMonkey that captured the same information as Session 2, which included mood, 
arousal, and their recollection of as many of the 57 images as they could remember.  
Finally, participants were thanked for their contribution and provided with debriefing 
information that could be printed out (see Appendix G).  This took approximately 10 
minutes. 
Results 
Demographic Profile 
There were 101 people who completed Session 1, of which 68 were females and 
33 were males (67.33% female).  Of the 92 people who completed Session 2 there were 
62 females and 30 males (67.39% female).  For Session 3, 77 individual competed the 
study, 52 individuals were females and 25 were males (68% female).  Therefore, attrition 
was similar for females and males. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the groups so that 51 were in the 
Experimental condition and 50 were in the Control condition.   For Session 2, 49 of the 
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participants were from the Experimental condition and 43 were from the Control 
condition.  For Session 3, 39 participants were from the experimental group and 38 from 
the control group.  
Groups were compared using a General Linear Univariate Model for differences 
in base rates for Age, Sex, and Picture Order (Table 1).  There were no significant 
differences between groups for Age (F[23,100] = 1.195, p = 0.301), Sex (F[1,101] = 
0.001, p = 0.979), and Picture Order (F[2,101] = 0.126, p = 0.634).  
 
Table 1.  
General Linear Univariate Model to examine for Group differences for Sex, Age, and 
Picture Order  
 
Effect Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df F Sig. 
Corrected Model 13.764 58 0.868 0.695 
Intercept 129.255 1 472.748 <0.001 
Sex 0.000 1 0.001 0.979 
Age 7.514 23 1.195 0.301 
Picture Order 0.252 2 0.461 0.634 
Sex x Age 2.941 9 1.195 0.323 
Sex x Picture Order 0.747 2 1.367 0.266 
Age x Picture Order 1.961 14 0.512 0.912 
Sex x Age x Picture Order 0.120 4 0.110 0.978 
Error 11.483 42   
Total 254.000 101   
Corrected Total 25.248 100   
 
Personality Profile 
The mean scale scores for the personality traits are presented in the Table 2, these 
scores are similar to the NEO-PI-R reported means. 
 
Table 2.   
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Mean Personality Scale Scores for Participants 
Personality Scale N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Neuroticism 101 4 40 21.00 8.142 
Extraversion 101 14 42 30.80 5.503 
Openness to Experience 101 18 42 30.23 6.278 
Agreeableness 101 14 43 31.00 5.769 
Conscientiousness 101 12 47 30.96 7.155 
Personality traits were examined using a General Linear Multivariate Model for 
differences in Sex, Group, and Picture Order (Table 3).  There was a significant 
difference in Sex (F[5,85] = 4.093, p = 0.002); the between subject factors being 
significant for Agreeableness (F[1,89] = 5.88, p =  0.017) and Conscientiousness (F[1,89] 
= 4.02, p = 0.048).  Women had higher Agreeable and Conscientious scale scores than 
men, M = 32.00 versus M = 28.94 and M = 31.93 versus M = 28.97 respectively.  
Personality sex differences are expected due to the naturally occurring mean differences 
(Costa & McRae, 1992).  Further, there was a marginally significant interaction between 
Sex, Grouping, and Neuroticism (F[1,89] = 4.49, p = 0.037). 
 
Table 3.  
General Linear Multivariate Model to examine for Group differences for Sex, Age, and 
Picture Order  
 
Effect F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept 2165.092 5 85 <0.001 
Sex 4.093 5 85 0.002 
Group 2.008 5 85 0.086 
Picture Order 1.095 10 170 0.369 
Sex x Group 1.522 5 85 0.192 
Sex x Picture Order 1.360 10 170 0.203 
Group x Picture Order 0.951 10 170 0.488 
Sex x Group x Picture Order 0.497 10 170 0.890 
Note.  Wilks’ Lamba statistic was used for calculations 
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Figures 5 to 9 present histograms of the scale score values of the personality traits 
to demonstrate the variability of distributions for each of the traits.   
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Figure 5:  Distribution of participant scale scores for Neuroticism measured using the 
NEO-FFI.
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Figure 6:  Distribution of participant scale scores for Extroversion measured using the 
NEO-FFI. 
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Figure 7:  Distribution of participant scale scores for Openness to Experience measured 
using the NEO-FFI. 
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Figure 8:  Distribution of participant scale scores for Agreeableness measured using the 
NEO-FFI. 
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Figure 9:  Distribution of participant scale scores for Conscientiousness measured using 
the NEO-FFI. 
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Valence and Arousal 
The participants’ report of IAPS image hedonic valance and arousal levels were 
analyzed.  The mean hedonic rating for IAPS images was 4.77 (SD 2.37) mood and the 
mean arousal rating was 4.55 (SD 2.32).  See Figure 10 and 11 for illustration of the 
distributions.  The ostensibly flat distributions in the hedonic ratings support the choice of 
57 images from the complete set of IAPS images.  That is, each hedonic valence and 
arousal rating were adequately represented by the choice of images.  
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Figure 10.  Frequency of Hedonic Valence ratings given by the 101 participants for the 
57 images. 
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Figure 11.  Frequency of Arousal ratings given by the 101 participants for the 57 images 
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Memory Recall 
Prior to the analysis of the participants’ recall information, two judges 
independently examined the recalled items to determine if the description provided by the 
participants matched one of the 57 experimental images.  The independent judges agreed 
on 1367 recollections and disagreed on 48 of the recollections (agreement 96.61% of the 
time).  The 48 recollections that were not agreed upon were not used in the analyses.  
Participants also often recalled the practice items that had been presented to accustom 
them to the experiment.  Recollections of practice items were also not used in the 
analyses.  The degree of inter-rater agreement is similar to the one by Stones and Bygate 
(2009) who demonstrated a very high inter-rater reliability for items recalled or not 
recalled (reliability of .95). 
  There were a total of 57 images that could be recalled for each of the three time 
periods.  The mean number of items recalled in Session 1 was 23.37 (SD 26.22), in 
Session 2 was 17.67 (SD 26.22), and in Session 3 was 13.11 (SD 23.94).  See Table 4 for 
a listing of the items recalled by condition and session.   
Table 4.  
Successful Recall of the 57 Images over the Three Sessions 
 
Session 
 
Group 
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Session 1 Control 50 22.48 7.54 7 38 
(immediate) Experimental 51 24.71 8.51 4 46 
 Total 101 23.60 8.04 4 46 
Session 2 Control 45 17.24 9.59 0 35 
(two days) Experimental 49 19.88 9.32 2 43 
 Total 94 18.62 9.49 0 43 
Session 3 Control 38 16.71 8.65 1 32 
(nine days) Experimental 39 17.79 9.39 2 41 
 Total 77 17.26 8.99 1 41 
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Although Session 2 emails were sent out 24 hours after the completion of session 
one there was great variance in responding to the online questionnaire (M = 2.20 days, 
SD = 1.98 days).  The average time of response for Session 3 participants was also varied 
(M = 9.07 days, SD = 6.90 days).  The issue of a variable response time is important 
because memory is known to decay over time.  Memory decay is understood to proceed 
quickly at first and then become more gradual over time.  Therefore, it would be expected 
that any effects of time of responding would be more pronounced during Session 2 in 
comparison to Session 3. 
A bivariate correlation analysis was conducted to examine for any effects of the 
responding time following the presentation of items.  Included in the analysis were 
number of hours till Session 2, number of hours until Session 3, number of images 
recalled at Session 1, number of images recalled at Session 2, and number of images 
recalled at Session 3.  Time of response for Sessions 2 and 3 were not significant 
contributors to the number of items recalled during those sessions.  There was a slightly 
negative correlation during Session 2 between time of recall and number of recalled, 
which was expected, but it was not significant.  Therefore, the recall of images was not 
affected by the variation in response timing for Sessions 2 and 3.  As expected, the 
number of items recalled during Sessions 1, 2, and 3 were all significantly correlated with 
each other.  There was a significant correlation of number of items recalled at Session 1 
and 2 (r = 0.771, df = 101, p < 0.001), between number of items recalled at Session 1 and 
Session 3 (r = 0.806, df = 77, p < 0.001), and between number of items recalled at 
Session 2 and Session 3 (r = 0.936, df = 77, p < 0.001).  See Table 5 for the complete list 
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of correlations.  These findings demonstrate that even though memory is generally 
understood to decay over time and although participants responded to the emails at 
different times, the variation in response times was not enough to significantly affect the 
number of items recalled.  The number of items recalled during each session was highly 
correlated with the number of items recalled at later sessions providing some support that 
the individuals provided good effort to the study even when doing Sessions 2 and 3 from 
locations that were convenient to them. 
 
Table 5.   
Correlations between time of recall and number of items recalled 
 S1 images 
recalled 
Elapsed 
time before 
S2 
S2 images 
recalled 
Elapsed 
time before 
S3 
S3 images 
recalled 
S1 images recalled 
     Pearson Correlation 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 
     N 
 
 
1 
 
101 
    
Elapsed time before S2 
     Pearson Correlation 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 
     N 
 
 
.068 
.514 
94 
 
1 
 
94 
   
S2 images recalled 
     Pearson Correlation 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 
     N 
 
 
.771 
.000 
94 
 
-.179 
.085 
93 
 
1 
 
94 
  
Elapsed time before S3 
     Pearson Correlation 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 
     N 
 
 
.059 
.607 
79 
 
-.048 
.672 
79 
 
.131 
.249 
79 
 
1 
 
79 
 
 
S3 images recalled 
     Pearson Correlation 
     Sig. (2-tailed) 
     N 
 
.806 
.000 
77 
 
-.145 
.208 
77 
 
.936 
.000 
77 
 
.092 
.428 
77 
 
1 
 
77 
Note. S1 = Session 1, S2 = Session 2, S3 = Session 3 
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Influences on Hedonic and Arousal 
The Generalized Linear Model (GLM) function is being used with increasing 
frequency for many sciences where there is interdependence between variables.  One 
advantage of GLM is that there is greater flexibility in the number of observations and 
greater flexibility for the variance of the observations for each subject.  GLM is 
particularly appropriate because it can take account of missing data without casewise 
deletion.  Further, using GLM there is an assumption that observed variables at times 1, 
2, and 3 are related rather than independent.  Given this experimental design, GLM was 
used.  The covariates of Sex, Intervention, Mood, Arousal, and personality variables were 
centred on grand means, the order of presentation was used as a repeated term, and order 
categories a factorial term.  Mood and Arousal refer to the individual’s ratings of each of 
the 57 IAPS images. 
Hedonic Ratings 
The initial GLM analysis examined how hedonic rating was affected by 
Intervention, Sex, Age, and Picture Order (see Table 6).  Picture Order was used were 
included in all GLM analyses due to the expected effect of image on hedonic rating, 
arousal rating, and recall for all time periods.  Across all analyses Picture Order was 
significant and due to space concerns the inclusion of 57 images they are not reported in 
the tables.  There was a significantly (p = 0.011) higher level of moods in males 
(coefficient of 0.1993) and a significantly (p = 0.036) higher mood in the Experimental 
condition (coefficient of 0.1659).   
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Table 6.  
 
Generalized Linear Model to examine for differences in Hedonic Levels for Intervention, 
Sex, Age, and Picture Order 
 
   95% Wald 
Confidence 
Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Effect B 
Standard 
Error 
Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept 6.133 0.1882 5.7637 6.5013 1062.0311 1 >0.001 
Intervention 0.166 0.0790 0.0111 0.3208 4.4130 1 0.036 
Sex (Male) 0.199 0.0782 0.0460 0.3527 6.4927 1 0.011 
Sex x Intervention 0.099 0.1570 -0.2088 0.4065 0.3965 1 0.529 
Age 0.007 0.0052 -0.0036 0.0169 1.6335 1 0.201 
Note.  Dependent variable: Mood Rating from 1 (unpleasant) to 9 (pleasant) 
 
 
In the second analysis, Personality Traits were added to the list of variables to 
determine any effects they might have.  Sex was again significant (p = 0.018) with a 
higher level of mood in males (coefficient of 0.204).  A higher level of Openness was 
also significantly (p = 0.002) related to hedonic ratings (coefficient of 0.016).  However, 
with the addition of personality traits, Group was no longer a significant predictor of 
hedonic rating (see Table 7).  Given that Sex was significant for the first set of analyses 
with hedonic ratings, a GLM using a Sex x Group interaction was included as well as the 
arousal ratings for items.  For the effects on hedonic ratings (Table 8), Sex continued to 
be significant (p = 0.031, estimated coefficient of 0.195) as did Openness (p = 0.001, 
estimated coefficient of 0.018).   
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Table 7.  
 
Generalized Linear Model to examine for differences in Hedonic Ratings for 
Intervention, Sex, Age, and Picture Order for the five personality traits 
 
 
 
  95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Effect B 
Standard 
Error 
Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept 6.132 0.188 5.764 6.501 1064.889 1 >0.001 
Intervention 0.142 0.082 -0.018 0.302 3.037 1 0.081 
Sex (Male) 0.204 0.087 0.035 0.374 5.567 1 0.018 
Sex x Intervention 0.154 0.164 -0.168 0.476 0.880 1 0.348 
Age 0.002 0.005 -0.008 0.012 0.176 1 0.675 
Neuroticism -0.003 0.006 -0.014 0.009 0.224 1 0.636 
Extroversion -0.011 0.007 -0.024 0.001 3.010 1 0.083 
Openness 0.016 0.005 0.006 0.027 9.416 1 0.002 
Agreeableness  0.007 0.008 -0.007 0.022 0.970 1 0.325 
Conscientiousness 0.009 0.006 -0.003 0.020 2.308 1 0.129 
Note.  Dependent variable: Mood Rating from 1 (unpleasant) to 9 (pleasant) 
 
Table 8.  
Generalized Linear Model to examine for differences in Hedonic Ratings for 
Intervention, Sex, Sex x Intervention, Item Arousal, Age, and Picture Order for the five 
personality traits 
 
 
 
  95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Effect B 
Standard 
Error 
Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept 6.130 0.190 5.758 6.501 1045.311 1 >0.001 
Intervention 0.140 0.081 -0.020 0.300 2.947 1 0.086 
Sex (Male) 0.195 0.090 0.018 0.372 4.671 1 0.031 
Sex x Intervention 0.149 0.165 -0.173 0.472 0.822 1 0.365 
Arousal -0.023 0.041 -0.103 0.057 0.323 1 0.570 
Age 0.003 0.005 -0.007 0.012 0.273 1 0.601 
Neuroticism -0.002 0.006 -0.014 0.009 0.158 1 0.691 
Extroversion -0.011 0.007 -0.024 0.002 2.680 1 0.102 
Openness 0.018 0.006 0.007 0.029 10.185 1 0.001 
Agreeableness  0.008 0.008 -0.007 0.023 1.019 1 0.313 
Conscientiousness 0.009 0.006 -0.002 0.021 2.408 1 0.121 
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Note.  Dependent variable: Mood Rating from 1 (unpleasant) to 9 (pleasant) 
 
Arousal Ratings 
The next set of analyses examined Arousal Ratings for Intervention, Sex, and Age 
and there were no significant relationships (see Table 9).  When Personality Traits were 
added to the GLM analysis, a higher level of Openness was significantly (p > 0.0001) 
related to arousal ratings (estimated coefficient of 0.034) (Table 10).  For Arousal ratings 
(Table 11), Openness was again significant (p > 0.001, estimated coefficient of 0.064). 
 
Table 9.  
 
Generalized Linear Model to examine for differences in Arousal Ratings for Intervention, 
Sex, Age, and Picture Order 
 
   95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Effect B 
Standard 
Error 
Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept 4.436 0.227 3.991 3.881 381.874 1 >0.001 
Intervention -0.004 0.203 -0.402 0.393 0.000 1 0.984 
Sex (Male) -0.387 0.237 -0.852 0.077 2.672 1 0.102 
Sex x Intervention -0.093 0.473 -1.020 0.834 0.039 1 0.844 
Age 0.028 0.145 0.000 0.057 3.760 1 0.052 
Note.  Dependent variable: Arousal Rating from 1 (calm) to 9 (excited) 
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Table 10.  
 
Generalized Linear Model to examine for differences in Arousal Ratings for Intervention, 
Sex, Age, and Picture Order for the five personality traits 
 
   95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Effect B 
Standard 
Error 
Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept 4.436 0.226 3.993 4.878 386.329 1 >0.001 
Intervention -0.094 0.198 -0.481 0.293 0.226 1 0.634 
Sex (Male) -0.202 0.450 -1.085 0.681 0.201 1 0.654 
Sex x Intervention -0.394 0.237 -0.859 0.071 2.753 1 0.097 
Age 0.023 0.016 -0.008 0.053 2.082 1 0.149 
Neuroticism 0.020 0.012 -0.004 0.043 2.738 1 0.098 
Extroversion 0.018 0.018 -0.017 0.054 1.022 1 0.312 
Openness 0.064 0.015 0.034 0.093 17.517 1 >0.001 
Agreeableness  0.009 0.019 -0.028 0.047 0.226 1 0.634 
Conscientiousness 0.012 0.012 -0.011 0.035 0.997 1 0.318 
Note.  Dependent variable: Arousal Rating from 1 (calm) to 9 (excited) 
 
Table 11.  
Generalized Linear Model to examine for differences in Arousal Ratings for Intervention, 
Sex, Sex x Intervention, Item Mood Rating, Age, and Picture Order for the five 
personality traits 
 
   95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Effect B 
Standard 
Error 
Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept 4.472 0.228 4.025 4.918 385.698 1 >0.001 
Intervention -0.090 0.199 -0.479 0.299 0.207 1 0.649 
Sex (Male) -0.198 0.451 -1.081 0.685 0.193 1 0.660 
Sex x Intervention -0.388 0.237 -0.852 0.075 2.695 1 0.101 
Mood -0.026 0.040 -0.104 0.052 0.437 1 0.509 
Age 0.023 0.016 -0.008 0.053 2.097 1 0.148 
Neuroticism 0.020 0.012 -0.004 0.043 2.706 1 0.100 
Extroversion 0.018 0.018 -0.017 0.053 0.983 1 0.321 
Openness 0.064 0.015 0.034 0.094 17.775 1 >0.001 
Agreeableness  0.009 0.019 -0.028 0.047 0.236 1 0.627 
Conscientiousness 0.012 0.012 -0.011 0.035 1.038 1 0.308 
Note.  Dependent variable: Arousal Rating from 1 (calm) to 9 (excited) 
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Recall in Relation to Demographic Variables and Personality 
A Multivariate General Linear Model was run to examine how the dependent 
variables of items recalled during Session 1, Session 2, and Session 3 were related to the 
fixed factors of Sex, and Group, for the covariates of the five raw scores representing 
personality variables.  There were no significant effects for Sex or for Group.  There was 
a significant effect for Neuroticism (F = 3.20, df = 65, p = 0.029).  Interestingly, the 
effect of Neuroticism was more pronounced in Session 1 (F = 8.67, p = 0.004) not 
present in Session 2 (F = 2.59, p = 0.113) and again significant in Session 3 (F = 4.07, p 
= 0.048).  Extraversion was also related to the number of images recalled, although only 
for Session 2 (F = 5.63, p = 0.021) and Session 3 (F = 4.68, p = 0.034).  Similarly, 
Agreeableness was significantly related to the number of items recalled for Session 2 (F 
= 6.20, p = 0.015) and Session 3 (F = 7.43, p = 0.008). 
Recall of Images 
GLM analyses were then conducted to examine the dependent variable of Recall.  
In the first analysis, Group, Mood, a Quadratic Mood, Arousal, Sex, Age, and Personality 
Traits were examined for their effects on Recall at Session 1, recall immediately 
following the presentation of items (see Table 12).  A quadratic function was used for 
mood because there is a hypothesized greater recall for items with a negative hedonic 
valence and items with a positive hedonic valence when compared to items with neutral 
hedonic valence.  There was a significantly (p < 0.001) lower level of Mood (estimated 
coefficient of -0.339) and a significantly (p < 0.001) higher level of Mood Quad 
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(estimated coefficient of 0.038).  There was also a significantly (p = 0.001) lower level of 
Neuroticism (estimated coefficient of -0.023). 
Table 12.  
Generalized Linear Model to examine for differences in Session 1 Recalled Items for 
Group, Mood, a quadratic Mood function, Arousal, Sex, Age, and personality traits 
 
 
   95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Effect B 
Standard 
Error 
Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept -0.375 0.211 -0.788 0.038 3.163 1 >0.001 
Intervention 0.153 0.123 -0.088 0.393 1.544 1 0.214 
Mood -0.339 0.056 -0.449 -0.229 36.166 1 >0.001 
Mood Quad 0.038 0.006 0.027 0.050 45.376 1 >0.001 
Arousal 0.041 0.015 0.012 0.071 7.686 1 0.006 
Sex 0.049 0.132 -0.210 0.308 0.137 1 0.711 
Age -0.001 0.007 -0.014 0.012 0.015 1 0.903 
Neuroticism -0.023 0.007 -0.038 -0.009 10.740 1 0.001 
Extroversion -0.017 0.011 -0.038 0.004 2.428 1 0.119 
Openness 0.014 0.009 -0.003 0.031 2.729 1 0.099 
Agreeableness  0.020 0.013 -0.006 0.046 2.323 1 0.127 
Conscientiousness -0.005 0.009 -0.023 0.012 0.371 1 0.542 
Note.  Dependent variable: Session 1 recall of images 
 
Next Recall during Session 2, approximately 2 days after item presentation, was 
examined using the same variables (see Table 13).  Recall during Session 2 was 
significantly related to lower Mood (p < 0.001, estimated coefficient of -0.0277), higher 
Mood Quad (p < 0.001, estimated coefficient of 0.033), and lower Extraversion (p = 
0.022, estimated coefficient of -0.040), and higher Agreeableness (p = 0.022, estimated 
coefficient of 0.041). 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
 
Table 13.  
Generalized Linear Model to examine for differences in Session 2 Recalled Items for 
Group, Mood, a quadratic Mood function, Arousal, Sex, Age, and personality traits 
 
   95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Effect B 
Standard 
Error 
Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept -0.790 0.222 -1.226 -0.355 12.637 1 >0.001 
Intervention 0.232 0.181 -0.123 0.587 1.642 1 0.200 
Mood -0.277 0.056 -0.387 -0.166 24.019 1 >0.001 
Mood Quad 0.033 0.006 0.021 0.044 32.438 1 >0.001 
Arousal 0.043 0.016 0.011 0.075 6.968 1 0.008 
Sex 0.080 0.202 -0.317 0.476 0.154 1 0.694 
Age -0.002 0.014 -0.029 0.026 0.015 1 0.901 
Neuroticism -0.021 0.011 -0.043 0.001 3.625 1 0.057 
Extroversion -0.040 0.017 -0.074 -0.005 5.134 1 0.023 
Openness 0.012 0.015 -0.018 0.042 0.584 1 0.445 
Agreeableness  0.041 0.018 0.006 0.076 5.273 1 0.022 
Conscientiousness 0.008 0.012 -0.014 0.031 0.500 1 0.479 
Note.  Dependent variable: Session 2 recall of images 
 
 
Lastly, a GLM was used to see how Recall at Session 3 was affected by Group, 
Mood, Mood Quad, Arousal, Sex, Age, and personality traits (see Table 14).  Recall 
during Session 3, approximately 13 days after the presentation of times, was significantly 
related to lower Mood (p < 0.001, estimated coefficient of -0.216), Mood Quad (p < 
0.001, estimated coefficient of 0.025), and lower Neuroticism (p = 0.019, estimated 
coefficient of -0.039).  
The GLM analyses of hedonic ratings indicates higher levels for males and higher 
levels for people with higher levels of Openness personality trait.  The GLM analyses for 
arousal ratings indicated higher levels of arousal for people with higher degree of the 
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Openness trait.  After the inclusion of the alternative measure of Sex x Intervention 
Openness continued to positively correlate to mood and arousal ratings. 
 
Table 14.  
 
Generalized Linear Model to examine for differences in Session 3 Recalled Items for 
Group, Mood, a quadratic Mood function, Arousal, Sex, Age, and personality traits 
 
 
   95% Wald 
Confidence Interval 
Hypothesis Test 
Effect B 
Standard 
Error 
Lower Upper 
Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. 
Intercept -1.436 0.254 -1.935 -0.937 31.859 1 >0.001 
Intervention 0.207 0.219 -0.221 0.635 0.898 1 0.343 
Mood -0.216 0.059 -0.331 -0.101 13.500 1 >0.001 
Mood Quad 0.025 0.006 0.013 0.037 17.018 1 >0.001 
Arousal 0.029 0.015 -0.001 0.058 3.507 1 0.061 
Sex -0.026 0.278 -0.571 0.519 0.009 1 0.925 
Age -0.020 0.019 -0.058 0.018 1.107 1 0.293 
Neuroticism -0.039 0.017 -0.072 -0.006 5.487 1 0.019 
Extroversion -0.029 0.022 -0.072 0.014 1.705 1 0.192 
Openness 0.004 0.021 -0.037 0.044 0.031 1 0.859 
Agreeableness  0.024 0.023 -0.021 0.069 1.098 1 0.295 
Conscientiousness 0.041 0.017 0.008 0.075 5.856 1 0.016 
Note.  Dependent variable: Session 3 recall of images 
 
 
The GLM analyses for recall of items at the over the three sessions provided some 
findings that a lower mood rating was related to a greater recall across all time periods.  
Participant’s self-report ratings of arousal also predicted recall during Sessions 1 and 
Session 2, but not Session 3.  Perhaps the most surprising finding is that recall was 
negatively correlated with levels of Neuroticism during Session 1 (immediate recall) and 
Session 3 (recall after 13 days).  Taken together, negative items were recalled with 
greater frequency and people with higher levels of neuroticism recalled fewer items. 
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Discussion 
This study examined the effects of mood and personality traits upon memory over 
three time periods.  The first set of analyses examined demographic and personality 
differences between groups following random assignment to the Experimental or Control 
conditions.  Findings indicate that (1) there were no significant differences between the 
two groups for the measures of age, sex, personality, and order of presentation (three 
orders of item presentation were used to control for the serial position effect); (2) that 
attrition was as similar across the groups and sexes; and (3) there were differences 
between men and women for their mean levels of Agreeableness and Conscientiousness 
and sex differences are reported by the NEO-PI-R manual (Costa & McCrae, 1992).  
Overall, these results indicated that the groups were similar in composition and that 
random assignment was successful in producing groups of similar people.  
Recall was assessed at three time periods – immediately following the 
experiment, approximately two days following the experiment, and approximately nine 
days following the experiment.  Session 2 requests were sent out approximately 24 hours 
completing Session 1, and Session 3 requests were sent out approximately seven days 
after Session 1.  Participants exhibited considerable variation in the number of hours it 
took them to participate in Sessions 2 and 3.  In spite of the variable time of response 
following the initial item presentation, there was no significant effect for the number of 
items recalled.  Fewer items were recalled as time progressed from Session 1 (M = 23.37, 
SD = 26.22) to Session 2 (M = 17.67, SD = 26.22) to Session 3 (M = 13.11, SD = 23.94), 
suggesting that forgetting occurred over time.  Also interesting was that although the 
mean recalled items changed, the variance in recalled means was large and remained 
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similar, with a very high correlation between items recalled in Sessions 1, 2, and 3.  
These results suggest that although individual differences in recall ability are highly 
variable, recall rates diminish similarly over time.  These innate differences in ability 
may be important when studying the memory for images by creating floor and ceiling 
effects associated with personality traits.  For example, it may be that people with low 
levels of memory ability are more affected by personality traits for filtering important 
data for recall.  It would be interesting to examine various facets of memory (e.g., 
auditory, visual, immediate, short-term) and personality for any interactions.  
Initially, there was apprehension that Sessions 2 and 3 may produce dissimilar 
outcomes because they were not conducted in a controlled laboratory environment; 
during Sessions 2 and 3 subjects participated at locations of their choosing, wherever they 
had an internet connection and the time to answer the questions.  This apprehension was 
upheld, in part, by the variation in response times for Sessions 2 and 3.  However, the 
high degree of correlation between the numbers of items answered between all three 
sessions provides support that participants genuinely participated with good effort.  
Further, the differences in correlations between Sessions 1 and 2 and between Sessions 1 
and 3 (r = .771 and r = .806 respectively) and the strong correlation between Sessions 2 
and 3 (r = 0.936) are to be expected given how memory decays over time.  The strong 
correlations in recall between the three sessions are consistent with the Ebbinghaus 
(1885) forgetting curve (see Figure 12).  This curve describes a greater decay in memory 
after the first two days in comparison to the next 7 days, between Sessions 2 and 3.  
Further, the act of recalling the images in Session 2 may reinforce those memories so that 
they are more likely to be remembered during Session 3.  Finally, the very high degree of 
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correlation between remembered items in Session 2 and Session 3 could represent the 
expected level of decay for the stimulus provided (M = 17.67 to M = 13.11), recalling on 
average 4.56 fewer items. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12:  Ebbinghaus memory curve.  The y-axis represents the number of retained 
words and the x-axis represents the number of days after learning the words. 
 
 
  The successful random assignment between groups and the recall correlation 
data provide evidence to support the internal validity of the study.  The results of from 
this study are summarized in Figure 13 and deviate from the hypotheses presented in 
Figure 4.  The hypotheses will be reviewed and reasons for the deviation will be 
considered. 
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Figure 13.  A model of recall demonstrating the interaction of mood induction, 
personality traits and image characteristics. 
 
Image Characteristics 
Hypothesis 1.  The hedonic valence will be correlated with image recall.   
The prominent finding from the current study was that the hedonic valence of the 
images was a negatively correlated with recall.  That is, items judged to have a negative 
hedonic rating were more likely to be recalled in Session 1 (B = -0.339, SE = 0.056).  
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Further, a quadratic function for hedonic rating was significantly correlated with recall (B 
= 0.038, SE = 0.006).  This suggests that while images with a positive hedonic valence 
were not recalled as frequently as images with a negative hedonic valence, they were 
recalled with greater frequency when compared to items with a neutral hedonic valence.  
This pattern continued in Session 2 where the hedonic rating was significant (B = -0.277, 
SE = 0.056) and the quadratic function for hedonic rating was also significant (B = 0.033, 
SE = 0.006) and continued in Session 3 for hedonic rating (B = -0.216, SE = 0.219) and 
the quadratic function (B = 0.025, SE = 0.006).  These results indicate that negative items 
are recalled with greater frequency of positive items which are recalled with greater 
frequency than neutral items.  Stones and Bygate (2009) also found that the hedonic 
valence of the images were correlated with recall and followed a “U-shape” for the 
control group and a  “J-shape” for the intervention group with negative images having a 
greater probability of recall than positive images, which had a higher probability of recall 
than neutral images.  In contrast, this study indicated a “J-shape” for all participants.  
The emotional perception of an image is a primary determinant in the success of 
recalling that image immediately after presentation, a couple of days after presentation, 
and over a week after seeing the items.  As other researchers have indicated, emotions are 
deeply tied to our ability to recall an image and this study provides further evidence of 
this effect.  Further, this study demonstrates that the effects of image hedonic valence 
continue on when participants were asked to recall in information over three time periods. 
This study was designed to closely follow the procedure employed by Stones and 
Bygate (2009) in order to compare results across the two studies. Their study examined 
participants at one point in time (immediately after presentation) and did not include 
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personality variables.  In their study, participants recalled on average 26.22 of the 57 
images that were presented, which is similar to the recall rate in this study of 23.37 
images for Session 1.  One potential difference in the two studies is that for this study, 
image presentation was on a 20-second cycle, 6 seconds of image presentation with the 
image removed for the following 14 seconds.  Stones and Bygate presented items in 
quicker succession; images in their study were presented without a mandatory 14-second 
pause.  Participants were able to immediately view the next image after they had 
completed rating the valence and arousal level of the current image.  The use of a 14-
second duration of image withdrawal between IAPS item presentations likely increased 
the duration of the experiment and could have contributed to the decreased recall rate 
(M= 26.22 for Stones & Bygate vs. M = 23.57 for this study). 
Hypothesis 2.  High arousal images will have higher levels of recall.  Stones 
and Bygate (2009) reported that Arousal affected the probability of recall, with images 
with higher arousal levels being recalled more frequently; this was also confirmed by our 
study for Sessions 1 and 2 but not 3.  This suggests that the level of arousal generated by 
an image is less stable over time when compared to the hedonic valence of an image.  
Previously described research by Sharot and Phelps (2004) concluded that level of word 
arousal decreased the rate of memory decay.  They had found that memory of high 
arousal items remained robust after 24 hours.   These results are consistent with Sharot 
and Phelps while further proposing that arousal is less important for memory after a one 
week period.  These results suggest that long term memory has a stronger hedonic 
valence than arousal component.   To improve long term recall it is more important that 
information be meaningful than it be shocking.  Stones and Bygate, however, found a 
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difference between levels of arousal ratings between the treatment condition and the 
control condition, whereas there was no significant effect of arousal between groups in 
this experiment.   
Intervention 
Hypothesis 3.  Participants in the Experimental condition will rate all images 
with a more negative hedonic valence.  Stones and Bygate also demonstrated that for 
participants in the intervention condition, images were rated as more negative, while the 
results of this study demonstrated that images were rated as more positive for people in 
the intervention condition.  The initial GLM analyses demonstrated that images were 
given higher hedonic rating if participants were in the intervention group (B = 0.142) and 
if the participants were male (B = 0.199).  It had been hypothesized that hedonic valence 
ratings would be lower in the intervention group but the opposite was true.  There are two 
immediate explanations for this finding.  First, it is possible that participants who 
experienced a negative mood induction were briefly desensitized to negativity thereby 
rating all images more positively.  This may be the result of natural mechanisms for self-
protection.  There is some recent evidence to demonstrate that this might be possible, Wu 
and Thierry (2012) presented words that had either positive or negative hedonic valence 
to participants who spoke fluent English and whose native language was Chinese.  They 
found that a negative word presented in a second language inhibits access to that word in 
the participant’s native language.  In the present study, a negative mood induction could 
have insulated or desensitized individuals from the negative images. 
One potential issue with the desensitization explanation for mood differences 
between groups is the short duration for general mood induction effects.  Mood induction 
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does not last long and is highly susceptible to changes in perception.  The Velten 
procedure, for example, was demonstrated to last less than 30 minutes (Eich & Metcalfe, 
1989).  There is no evidence to suggest that the Imagination task used for mood induction 
in this study is a longer-lasting technique than the Velten mood induction.  Additionally, 
as part of the procedure for Session 1, mood induction occurred and then participants 
read instructions for five minutes (Appendix D), prior to providing a self-rating of their 
current mood level.  Participant self-rating of current mood, after mood induction (or 
control task), and prior to viewing images was not different between groups.  It is 
possible that the mood induction technique produced a result that was an artifact of the 
experiment.  However, it is also likely that the negative mood induction desensitized 
participants to negative experiences and that this detail was not able to be capture by the 
single question “please rate your current mood”.   
Participants in the Experimental condition rated images more positively than 
people in the Control condition.  This is counter to our expectations and previous 
literature which stated that people who experience a negative mood induction would rate 
images as more negative.  Additionally, the effect of the intervention was not significant 
when personality traits were added into the GLM function.   
Hypothesis 4.  Participants in the Experimental condition will recall negative 
images better than positive images.  Across all three periods of recall, the Experimental 
condition was not correlated with recall.  In contrast to these findings, Stones and Bygate 
demonstrated that recall was affected by the intervention.  They demonstrated a mood 
congruent memory effect for participants in their intervention condition because they 
were more likely to recall images with a negative hedonic valence.   
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The type of mood induction used in this experiment was unlikely to produce a 
consistent effect throughout the presentation of items as compared to other techniques.  
This is due to the general transient characteristics of mood induction, an induced mood 
dissipates readily.  The transient nature of mood inductions is very good for working with 
volunteer students who may be participating during personally busy times.  Further, the 
addition of a 14-second delay in the procedure increased the length of the experiment 
further affecting the mood induction procedure.  It is plausible that alternate methods of 
mood induction that have longer lasting effects would have demonstrated group 
differences and these differences may resemble more intense real-life situations (e.g., a 
state of depressed mood, attending a sad event).  The continuous music technique used by 
Eich and Metcalfe (1989) would likely demonstrate more prominent mood effects.   
Personality Traits 
Hypothesis 5.  People with high neuroticism scale scores will report more 
negative ratings to the IAPS images.  This hypothesis was generated from the definition 
of neuroticism.  It was thought that because people with higher levels of neuroticism 
experience mood more frequently and intensely, that they would identify the IAPS 
images are more intense.  This assumption was not supported by these findings.   
Hypothesis 6. People with high neuroticism scale scores will recall unpleasant 
photographs with greater frequency.  Perhaps the most interesting finding was that 
Neuroticism was correlated with recall but opposite to what had expected.  Initially, it 
was predicted that higher levels of Neuroticism would be correlated with higher recall 
ability for images with negative hedonic valence.  Instead, Neuroticism was negatively 
correlated with recall in Session 1 (B = -0.023, SE = 0.007) and Session 3 (B = -0.039, SE 
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= 0.017) and although Session 2 was not significant (p = 0.057) the coefficient was in the 
same direction (B = -0.021, SE = 0.011) demonstrating the same trend.  Neuroticism 
describes an individual’s emotional stability; high levels of the Neuroticism traits identify 
individuals who are prone to psychological distress.  For the full version of the NEO-PI-
R, from which the NEO-FFI was developed, the subscales of Neuroticism include the 
facets of Anxiety, Angry Hostility, Depression, Self-Consciousness, Impulsiveness, and 
Vulnerability.  People with lower levels of Neuroticism are thought to be emotionally 
more stable and calm.  People with lower levels of Neuroticism recalled more images in 
Sessions 1 and 3.  From our initial findings, it is clear that hedonic ratings were not 
correlated with Neuroticism.  That is, people with high levels of Neuroticism did not rate 
images differently.  This finding is parallel to the finding by Anderson and Phelps (2001) 
who found that individuals with left amygdala lobectomy were able to provide normal 
Likert-type scale ratings to aversive stimuli indicating that they had understood the 
affective meaning of words presented.  Individuals with left amygdala lobectomy were 
not protected from an attentional blink with arousing word targets.  Nonetheless, images 
with positive and negative hedonic ratings were recalled with a greater frequency than 
images with neutral hedonic ratings. 
Remarkably, even though the people with high and low levels of Neuroticism 
ratings the hedonic valences of the image similarly, and even though people generally 
remembered images with negative or positive hedonic valence with greater success, 
people with high levels of Neuroticism, people more emotionally expressive, recalled 
fewer images.  The perception and understanding of each image, while generally 
important, was not the driving factor for the outcome of increased recall for people with 
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high Neuroticism.  People with high Neuroticism trait scores were affected by a process 
other than hedonic judgement of the image even though the hedonic valence would be the 
most obvious target for impact.  Moreover, this outcome occurred immediately after item 
presentation and was not a process involved in the later stages of memory; for example, 
rehearsal of the images would be a process more available in Sessions 2 and 3 and is 
unlikely to be a factor in Session 1.  One potential explanation for this outcome would be 
that attention levels differed among participants with higher and lower neuroticism scale 
scores; it is possible that people with lower levels of Neuroticism were more attentive to 
the experiment.  Items were displayed for six seconds and it is possible that for negative 
items, people with higher levels of the neuroticism trait were more likely to protect 
themselves from the image by attending less to the image.  In this way people with high 
and low levels of Neuroticism both agreed upon the image’s hedonic valence but people 
with higher levels of Neuroticism attended less to the image.  This account would fit with 
the research by Wu and Thierry (2012) who demonstrated that a self-protective 
mechanism in language.  This explanation may also fit the definition of hedonic rating 
provided by Lang et al. (1998), who developed the IAPS.  They asserted that a negative 
hedonic valence creates a defensive motivation.  It may be that that people with high 
Neuroticism, people who experience emotion more freely, accurately follow the urge for 
defensive motivation, that is, they are motivated to “move away” from the image or to 
disengage from viewing the image.  However, people with low levels of Neuroticism, 
stable people who are less likely to experience emotional shifts, are more likely to engage 
in “rubbernecking”.  It may be that people with low levels of Neuroticism wish to “study” 
the negative images because of the perceived importance of the image.  On the other 
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hand, people with high levels of Neuroticism engage in self-protection, recognizing the 
image’s qualities but avoiding further “study” of the image to protect themselves from 
becoming overwhelmed.   
Contrary to the notion of a reduced attention to the negative images are findings 
from previously described studies that demonstrated that memory for images is robust to 
varying levels of attention (e.g., Cuthbert et al., 1998; Sharot & Phelps, 2004; Talmi et 
al., 2007).  Another possible explanation to reconcile these differences is by examining 
the behaviours during testing.  A person engaged in a divided attention study is still 
attending to images but has their attention divided and the images are displayed quickly, 
not for a full 6 seconds like in this experiment.  The hypothesis presented stated that 
people with high levels of Neuroticism are more sensitive to negative images, which 
causes them to engage in self-protective behaviour and attend less to the image.  
Alternatively, it is possible that people with high Neuroticism are less sensitive to images 
due to desensitization, due from the more common experience of both positive and 
negative emotions, which may lead to placing less importance on emotional information.  
It would be feasible to test the hypotheses of reduced attention versus desensitization in 
future studies. 
Hypothesis 7.  People with high levels of extraversion will rate positive 
images as more positive.  There was no support for the effect of extraversion on the 
rating of images. 
Hypothesis 8.  People with higher levels of extraversion will have higher 
levels of base arousal rates.  Extraversion was not correlated with the reporting of 
arousal rates.  
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Additional personality findings – Openness to Experience.  The effect of the 
intervention was not significant when personality traits were added into the GLM 
function, although the Openness trait became a significant factor in how items were rated 
(B = 0.016, SE = 0.005).  Openness represents an individual’s propensity for fantasy, 
aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, and values.  It has also been correlated to intelligence.  
This set of characteristics gives the impression that the openness trait would allow people 
to have a more visceral experience and to rate the images more positively than people 
who had low scores for the Openness trait. 
It is also curious that although the Openness trait was positively correlated with 
hedonic ratings and to arousal ratings (images were viewed as more positive and more 
arousing) that the Openness trait was not correlated with Recall.  This may have been 
because recall was generally more affected by unpleasant images and Openness was 
correlated with positive images.  It may also be that the Openness trait may have merely 
shifted the hedonic ratings and the arousal ratings in a positive manner (e.g., adding +1 to 
all ratings) so that the differences in rating items remained relatively similar to the 
differences in ratings items from people with a low Openness trait. 
Arousal Ratings were also positively correlated with the Openness trait (B = 
0.064, SE = 0.015) and were unaffected by Sex, Intervention, and Age.  GLM functions 
were conducted with a Sex x Intervention interaction to examine for potential interactions 
effects for Hedonic ratings and Arousal ratings.  There were no significant effects for the 
interaction, which suggests that men and women were not differently affected by the 
negative mood induction. 
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Additional personality findings – Extraversion, Agreeableness, and 
Conscientiousness.  GLM analyses also demonstrated that personality traits were 
correlated with recall in unexpected ways.  In session 2, Extraversion was negatively 
correlated with the ability to recall images (B = -0.040, SE = 0.017) and Agreeableness 
was positively correlated with the recall of images (B = 0.041, SE = 0.018).  A low level 
of Extraversion is described as being introverted.  High Agreeableness is related to trust, 
straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tender-mindedness.  It is curious 
to see that these factors were relevant in Session 2 and did not even trend in the other two 
Sessions.  One explanation is that compliant introverts were more likely to provide a 
strong effort after a couple of days while responding at their leisure.  
 In session 3, Conscientiousness was positively correlated with recall (B = 0.041, 
SE = 0.008).  Conscientiousness is related to order, deliberation, self-discipline, and duty.  
It is interesting to note that mean score for Conscientiousness for Session 3 completers (N 
= 77) was 31.32 versus 30.96 for Session 1 completers (N = 101), demonstrating that 
people who completed the third session were not necessarily more conscientious.  In spite 
the high correlations between image recall for all sessions, it is possible that people with 
higher levels of Conscientiousness provided more effort in the third session, on average 
nine days after the initial experiment.  In addition, the lack of any correlations for 
Extraversion and Agreeableness may mean that those personality traits become less 
important with the passage of time for the recall of images.  
Limitations and Future Research 
A potential limitation of memory is the division of recall from recognition.  It is 
difficult to separate recognition tasks from recall tasks due to participants’ association of 
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similar themed items.  It is possible that some of the images that were recalled were 
primed by the hedonic valence of an alternative image, otherwise stated some images 
were recalled due to associations between images.  For example, it may have been easy to 
recall a spider if the person had initially recalled a snake. The result of this effect may be 
noticeable recall ability for negative and positive images as they may be more associated 
than neutral images.  Associations made between images would likely occur in real life in 
so doing assisting the recall of information, which would increase the external validity of 
these recall findings.  This experiment was designed to reduce potential associations 
between items by the method of image presentation.  This experiment used 57 images, 19 
with a negative hedonic valence, 19 with a positive hedonic valence, and 19 with a 
neutral hedonic valence.  The distribution of the images throughout the experiment was 
such that there was a balance of hedonic valences throughout the experiment.  Further, 
there were 14 seconds between image presentations to minimize the influence in recall or 
impression of hedonic valence from one picture to the next.  This gap in time allowed for 
at least some temporal and attentional distance between items with negative hedonic 
valence.  As noted, the mean number of recalled items for Session 1 was 23.37 with a 
standard deviation of 26.22 and a very high correlation of recalled items between 
sessions.  Between Sessions 1 and 2, approximately 2 days after initial presentation, 
people forgot an average of 5.7 images.  Between Sessions 2 and 3, after an additional 
seven days, people forgot on average another 4.56 images from Sessions 2 to 3.  The 
associations between items may be remedied using a larger number of images.  For 
example, participants can be tested using 120 images rather than 57, which may also 
assist with the large variation in individual ability.   
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Mood inductions experiments produce transient states that dissipate quickly.  The 
transient nature of mood inductions is very good for working with volunteer students who 
may be participating during personally busy times.  It may be beneficial for future studies 
to examine other mood induction techniques.  Alternate methods of mood induction that 
have longer lasting effects would be more robust over the duration of the experiment and 
may resemble more intense real-life situations (e.g., a state of depressed mood, attending 
a sad event).  Future studies should consider using the continuous music technique (e.g., 
Eich & Metcalfe, 1989) over the duration of the study in an effort to elicit prominent 
group differences.  Further, this type of prominent mood induction may demonstrate 
greater interactions between recall and personality traits. 
It may also be different results may be obtained by varying the type of induced 
mood.  In terms of the degree of recall, Eich and Macauley (2000) have stated that 
participants who had a sad mood induction often recalled positive and negative items 
equally well, while participants who had experienced a happy mood induction recalled 
more positive than negative items.  This study demonstrated that although the sad mood 
induction procedure created an asymmetric interpretation of the images, more negative 
items were recalled in both groups without any influence from the mood induction. The 
study by Eich and Macauley (2000) concluded that simulated moods may produce 
distinctly different profiles of mood congruent recall.  Future studies could examine 
simulated versus genuine mood.   
Emotion has been defined as a temporary state while mood has been described as 
diffuse and enduring (Larsen et al., 2008).  It would be interesting to examine how 
personality differences and mood induction interact to affect people experiencing a 
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genuine depressive mood versus people not experiencing a depressive mood.  Groups 
could be compared using the Beck Depression Inventory – 2 (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) to establish a general level of depressive symptomatology.  This would provide 
information to describe how people experiencing a genuine mood state, like major 
depressive disorder, are affected by a negative mood induction. 
Regarding the use of personality traits, the use the full version of Costa and 
McCrae’s personality inventory, the NEO-PI-R or the newest version, the NEO-PI-3, may 
be helpful in isolating specific characteristics important to memory.  Each personality 
trait consists of five or six facets and by using the full inventory researchers could 
examine specific trait facets for their influence on memory.  For example, it is 
conceivable that for the personality trait of Neuroticism that the facet of “vulnerability” is 
more important than the facet of “impulsiveness” in describing how a person is affected 
by the mood induction as well as by the hedonic rating of an image.  Alternatively, the 
facet of “impulsiveness” may provide insight as to why items are recalled to a greater or 
lesser degree.  For example, “impulsiveness” may be more correlated with how well 
someone attends to the images.  Despite the fact that these facets are highly correlated 
with one another it may be possible to isolate the facets of Neuroticism to gain more 
knowledge about how Neuroticism affects memory. 
Generally, this study successfully demonstrated that a recall task can be provided 
to participants outside of a formal laboratory.  Results demonstrated that most 
participants continued to participate at times even if it was two weeks after the initial 
presentation of items.  Future studies may wish to explore the use of the internet as an 
administration medium.  For example, participants could be randomly assigned to either 
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participate for all three sessions at home or all three sessions in a laboratory.  This may 
approximate current real world scenarios more faithfully.  Allowing people to participate 
in the study at their own convenience and without having to find and travel to a 
laboratory would likely increase the likelihood of participation.  Using an online design 
may make it feasible to extend the length of the experiment to examine recall after one 
month. 
This study demonstrated that images perceived as having negative hedonic 
valence were recalled with greater frequency over three time periods.  Asking 
participants to recall the same information over three time periods improves the 
participants’ memory at each successive stage due to the recollection and repetition of the 
images.  With such a large set of IAPS images to choose, this study could be designed 
use the remember-know procedure (Tulving, 1985), which would ask participants to view 
images and to state whether the image is new, remembered (considered to be recall 
memory), or known (considered to be recognition memory).  In this manner, recognition 
memory and recall memory could be examined for differences.  Participants may also 
find the remember-know design to be preferable to complete due to simplicity of their 
responses in comparison to having them spend time recalling and writing (or typing) 
descriptions of the images.  This might reduce attrition rates in future sessions.  Further, 
researchers could explore using the Faces subtest from the Wechsler Memory Scale – IV 
to gain a baseline of recognition memory that could then be compared to any recognition 
results using a mood induction experiment with a measurement of personality variables.  
Mood induction studies have found that any advantage due to mood induction is less 
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consistently demonstrated with recognition memory compared to recall memory 
(Christianson, 1992).  
Atienza and Cantero (2008) described findings that demonstrated how recall is 
affected by reduced sleep, while recognition was not affected by the lack of sleep.  
Although general levels of sleep may be evenly distributed between groups by means of 
random assignment, it may be helpful, especially when working with university students, 
to identify current sleep patterns using a sleep diary. 
Summary 
 This study examined the recall ability over three time periods for participants 
viewing 57 IAPS images – immediately after presentation, two days after presentation, 
and nine days after presentation.  There were 101 participants in Session 1, 92 people in 
Session 2, and 77 in Session 3.  Participants were randomly assigned to either a negative 
mood induction group or a control group.  Participants’ hedonic ratings and arousal 
ratings of the images were recorded and their personality traits were measured using the 
NEO-FFI.    
 The most prominent finding was that the perceived mood rating of the image 
predicted whether that image was recalled.  More specifically, negative images were 
recalled more frequently than positive images, which were recalled more frequently than 
neutral images.  The idea that negative and positive images are recalled with greater 
facility than neutral image can be explained in terms of an evolutionary perspective; it is 
good to pay attention to positive things, and it is very good to remember negative things.  
Higher arousal was correlated with a higher frequency of recall during Sessions 1 and 2 
but not for Session 3.  It is hypothesized that arousal is more useful for immediate 
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information and that arousal is not sustained over time.  Personality variables were also 
related to recall, most noticeably the trait of Neuroticism.  People with lower levels of 
Neuroticism were more likely to recall images.  It was hypothesized that people with 
higher levels of Neuroticism may be engaging in a form of self-preservation.  
Alternatively, the results may have been the result of desensitization for people with 
higher levels of Neuroticism.  Examining attention levels during the viewing of images 
could distinguish these two hypotheses.  Self-perseveration would require a diminished 
attention while desensitization would not. 
It was surprising that even though images were given higher hedonic rating if 
participants were in the intervention group and if the participants were male, there was no 
effect on recall for being in the intervention group or for being male.  This may have been 
due to the notion that images were rated as relatively more “pleasant” and that there was 
less of an effect demonstrated for positive images than there was for negative images. 
This study is one of the first to examine how mood induction can interact with 
personality variables and the hedonic valence of the images to influence recall over three 
time periods.  Future research should continue to examine personality factors in more 
detail and continue to use the internet and smartphones for experiment modalities. 
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Appendix A 
Pictures Chosen from the International Affective Picture Study (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2008).  Hedonic Valence and Arousal represent standardized response ratings, 
which range from 1 to 9 with a mean of 5. 
 
Image Description Slide 
Hedonic 
Valence Arousal 
Snake 1050 3.46 6.87 
Spider 1200 3.95 6.03 
Horse 1600 7.37 4.05 
Rabbit 1610 7.82 3.08 
Coyote 1640 6.27 5.13 
Woman on Beach 2030 6.71 4.54 
Angry Woman 2130 4.08 5.02 
Man and Baby 2150 7.92 5.00 
Neutral Man 2493 4.82 3.34 
Elderly Man 2500 6.16 3.61 
Elderly Woman 2510 6.91 4.00 
African Woman 2830 4.73 3.64 
Mutilated Face 3051 2.30 5.62 
Mutilated Body 3061 2.32 5.28 
Burn Victim 3110 1.79 6.70 
Bloody Finger 3150 2.26 6.55 
Surgery 3210 4.49 5.39 
Woman in Water 4250 6.79 5.16 
Man in Bed 4530 6.19 5.31 
Man on Beach 4531 5.81 4.28 
Romantic Couple 4599 7.12 5.69 
Couple in Bed 4666 6.24 6.10 
Mountains 5600 7.57 5.19 
River 5820 7.33 4.61 
Beach at Sunset 5830 8.00 4.92 
Gun Pointed Away 6200 3.20 5.82 
Gun Pointed Toward 6230 2.37 7.35 
Missile Range 6930 4.39 4.88 
Bomber Aircraft 6900 4.76 5.64 
Rolling Pin 7000 5.00 2.42 
Hair Dryer 7050 4.93 2.75 
Garbage Bin 7060 4.43 2.55 
Umbrella 7150 4.72 2.61 
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Lightbulb 7236 5.64 3.79 
Cake 7250 6.62 4.67 
Chocolate Soda 7270 7.53 5.76 
Wine 7280 7.20 4.46 
Turkey Dinner 7291 6.35 4.81 
Urban Building 7500 5.33 3.26 
City Landscape 7570 6.97 5.54 
Ski Jumper 8030 7.33 7.35 
Sailing 8080 7.73 6.65 
Gymnast 8090 7.02 5.71 
Pole Vaulter 8130 6.58 5.49 
Tennis Player 8350 7.18 5.18 
War Graves 9000 2.55 4.06 
Barbed Wire 9010 3.94 4.14 
Starving Child 9040 1.67 5.82 
Airplane Crash 9050 2.43 6.36 
Solemn Boy 9070 5.01 3.63 
Electrical Wires 9080 4.07 4.36 
Car Exhaust 9090 3.56 3.97 
Cow 9140 2.19 5.38 
Soldier 9160 3.23 5.87 
Dead Seals 9180 2.99 5.02 
Animal Carcass 9182 3.52 4.98 
Dirty Puddle 9341 3.38 4.50 
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Appendix B 
Dear Potential Participant, 
 
My name is Derick Cyr, I am a Doctoral student in the Clinical Psychology program at Lakehead 
University.  I am working under the supervision of Dr. Michael Stones.  I am writing this letter to 
request your participation in my study entitled The Influence of Personality Traits on Mood 
Induction and Memory.  This study has been approved by the Lakehead University Research 
Ethics Board (see contact information below). 
 
Our mood states can alter our perceptions and interpretations of everyday events.  We wish to 
examine how personality traits affect our moods and cognitions.  Current research has 
demonstrated that moods can affect cognitions.  In addition, research has demonstrated that 
personality traits can affect mood states.  Specifically, we plan to extend research findings that 
moods affect cognitions by further identifying individual differences in personality traits affect this 
process.  
 
Should you agree to participate, you will be asked to provide consent.  You will be asked to 
complete a brief questionnaire that identifies your personality traits.  Following this, you will sit in 
front of a computer screen to identify some cognitive processes.  The entire session will last 
approximately one hour.  After the session is complete, you will be asked to participate in two 
more sessions.  These extra two sessions will ask a few questions online and can be completed 
from a computer with access to the internet.  The extra sessions will take approximately 15 
minutes each. 
 
For your participation you will receive up to two bonus credits.  One bonus credit will be awarded 
after the first session and the second bonus credit will be awarded after session 3.  All information 
you provide will be confidential.  Once the data is collected, identifying information will be 
removed from the forms that contain the data.  In compliance with the Ontario Personal Health 
Information Protection Act and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act, documents will be stored in a locked filing cabinet.  Electronic data will be stored on a 
secured computer during data collection.  You are free to withdraw consent at any time without 
prejudice. You may choose not to answer any questions that are asked throughout the study, and 
this will have no bearing on the bonus credits you receive.  At your request, results will be mailed 
to you at the address you provide. 
 
Your participation in the study will enable us to better understand individual differences in 
cognitive processes.  The intent is to develop new insights that will be published in a peer 
reviewed journal.  The identity of participants will always remain confidential and information will 
be published in aggregate form.    
If you have any further questions regarding the research, please do not hesitate to contact us by 
phone or email. 
 
Thank you, 
 
 
____________________________ 
Derick Cyr (Student Investigator)      Office of Research 
Phone: (807) 252-5825        Lakehead University 
E-mail: dgcyr@lakeheadu.ca      955 Oliver Road 
P7B 5E1 
Dr. Michael Stones (Principal Investigator)     Phone (807) 343-8283  
Phone (807) 343-8994           
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E-mail: mstones@lakeheadu.ca
121 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
The Influence of Personality Traits on Mood Induction and Memory 
 
 
I,                                                                                            , the undersigned, hereby consent to 
participate as a subject in the research project entitled The Influence of Personality Traits on 
Mood Induction and Memory conducted at Lakehead University under the direction of Derick 
Cyr (Student Investigator) and Michael Stones (Principal Investigator). The procedures in this 
research project have been explained to me via an introductory statement, and are as follows: 
 
 This study examines how personality interacts with moods to affect cognitions.  The 
study will examine how individual differences can lead to differences in cognitions. 
 There are no known physical or psychological risks associated with this project. 
 The study will consist of three sessions.  The first session will be approximately one 
hour in duration.  In the first session a standardized personality inventory will be 
administered to identify personality traits.  Following the brief personality inventory, 
there will be a computer presentation of items and asked to respond to some 
questions from the computer display.  The second and third session will ask 
participants a few questions about the experiment.  The second and third sessions 
will take approximately 15 minutes each.  I understand that the risks of this 
experiment are minimal and that I am free to withdraw at anytime. 
 My consent is given of my own free choice without undue inducement or any element 
of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or any form of constraint or coercion.  I understand 
that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time without prejudice to me.  
Furthermore, I understand that I may choose not to answer any questions that are 
asked of me throughout the study, and this will have no bearing on the credit that I 
receive.  Participating in one stage of the study does not oblige me to participate in 
later stages.   
 All information gathered will be kept strictly confidential.   
 In any sort of report we might publish, we will not include any 
information that will make it possible to identify you.   
 All results obtained from this research will be kept confidential and remain in secure 
storage at Lakehead University for five years.   
 In return for my participation, I will be given up to two credits for participation. If I wish 
to have a summary of the results, I can request a copy from the investigators.   
 
 
 
 
________________________   _________________  _______________________ 
    
Participant`s Name (Print)  Date    Signature 
 
 
 
 
________________________   _________________  ________________________ 
    
Witness (Print)    Date    Signature 
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Appendix D 
Instructions for Rating Images 
 
We thank you for coming today and appreciate your participation in this 
experiment. In this study, we are interested in how people respond to 
pictures that represent a lot of different events that occur in life.  For the next 
30 minutes you will be looking at 57 different pictures on a computer 
display.  You will be rating each picture in terms of how it made you feel 
while viewing it.  There are no right or wrong answers, so simply respond as 
honestly as you can.  All responses will be confidential and your name is not 
indicated on the answer sheet.  Also, there may be other people also looking 
at images – however, they will be looking at a different order of image 
presentation. 
 
If you'll look at the page provided, you will that it has two columns of 
numbers, each arranged along a continuum.  This will be where you will rate 
how you felt while viewing each picture.  There are spaces for image ratings, 
2 practice images and 57 study images.  You can see that each scale has a 
range of 1 to 9.   
 
The first scale is the mood scale and it ranges from unpleasant to pleasant.  
At one extreme of the scale, you felt happy, pleased, satisfied, contented, 
hopeful.  If you felt completely happy while viewing the image, you can 
indicate this by circling the number 9, which is located above the word 
pleasant at the far right of the scale.  The other end of the scale is when you 
felt completely unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, melancholic, despaired, 
bored.  You can indicate by circling the number 1, which is located above 
the word unpleasant at the far left of the scale.  If you felt completely 
neutral, neither happy nor unhappy, circle the number 5, located above the 
word neutral in the middle of the scale.  The scales also allow you to 
describe intermediate feelings of pleasure, by circling any of the other 
numbers on the scale.  Please circle only one number per scale. 
 
The second scale is the arousal scale and it ranges from calm to excited.  At 
one extreme of the scale you felt stimulated, excited, frenzied, jittery, wide-
awake, aroused.  If you felt completely aroused while viewing the picture, 
circle the number 9 at located above the word excited at the far right of the 
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scale.  On the other hand, at the other end of the scale, you felt completely 
relaxed, calm, sluggish, dull, sleepy, unaroused.  You can indicate you felt 
completely calm by circling the number 1 located above the word calm at 
the far left of the scale.  If you are not at all excited nor at all calm, circle the 
number 5 in the middle of the scale.  As with the mood scale, you can 
represent intermediate levels by circling any of the other numbers. 
 
Some of the pictures may prompt emotional experiences; others may seem 
relatively neutral.  Your rating of each picture should reflect your immediate 
personal experience, and no more.  Please rate each one AS YOU 
ACTUALLY FELT WHILE YOU WATCHED THE PICTURE.  
 
The procedure will be as follows: Before each of the pictures, which you 
will rate, there will be a warning slide that indicates the item number where 
you should use to rate the upcoming picture.  At these times, you should 
always be certain that the picture number corresponds to the ratings page 
number.  It is important that your eyes be directed towards the screen when 
the pictures to be rated are shown.  You'll have only a few seconds to watch 
each picture.  Please view the picture for the entire time it is on and make 
your ratings after the picture is removed.  If, for some reason, you should 
miss viewing any picture, please leave that ratings page blank.  It is very 
important not to dwell on your ratings of the pictures, since there will not be 
much time.   
 
The first two pictures are just to help you get a feel for how the ratings are 
done.  They are labeled P1 and P2 on the response sheet.  After the picture is 
off, make your ratings on both dimensions as quickly as possible and get 
ready for the next picture.  It is important that we have information from 
each of you on all of these pictures.  There are no right or wrong answers; so 
rate every picture on all three dimensions.  You will have an opportunity to 
ask questions again after the two practice items.  Ready? 
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Appendix E 
 
 
Please circle the number that best describes your emotion the following two scales: 
 
 
 
 
 
Mood 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Unpleasant          Neutral          Pleasant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arousal 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Calm              Excited 
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Appendix F 
 
 
 
How pleasant was the image you just saw? 
 
 
Mood 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Unpleasant          Neutral          Pleasant 
 
 
 
 
 
How arousing was the image you just saw? 
 
 
Arousal 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Calm              Excited 
 
 
 
Please indicate your responses on the answer sheet provided. 
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Appendix G 
 
 
Debriefing Form 
 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in our study: The Influence of Personality 
Traits on Mood Induction and Memory.  Our study is investigating how personality 
traits influence moods and cognitions.  
 
  
Current research strongly suggests that a person’s current mood state affects which 
images people will later remember.  Your participation in the study will enhance our 
ability to identify potential ways of improving memory for images.  In public policy (e.g., 
drinking and driving campaigns), moods and images are often used to convey a 
message and it would be beneficial for people who create these images to understand 
how to maximize their effectiveness.  This study may provide evidence to demonstrate 
how individual personality traits are related to mood induction and memory for images.  
By understanding the link between personality traits, mood induction, and memory, 
policy makers may be able to tailor their messages for particular populations.  Positive 
findings from this study would be the first step to increased effectiveness of policy 
implementation. 
 
If participating in this study or completing the questionnaires has distressed you or has 
raised personal issues that you would like to discuss, or if you just need someone to talk 
to, the following organizations are available: the Crisis Response Program, Canadian 
Mental Health Association (807-346-8282), the Lakehead University Counselling Centre 
(807-343-8361), and Lakehead University Chaplain (807-343-8002).  For more 
information about mental health programs in Ontario, call the free, confidential, and 
anonymous line, available 24 hours – the Mental Health Service Information Ontario (1-
866-531-2600). 
 
Thank you, 
 
 
 
____________________________ 
Derick Cyr (Student Investigator)      
Phone: (807) 252-5825        
E-mail: dgcyr@lakeheadu.ca  
 
Dr. Michael Stones (Principal Investigator)        
Phone (807) 343-8994          
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E-mail: mstones@lakeheadu.ca 
